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As the United States exits Iraq and Afghanistan, it must begin the long process of 
preparing for future challenges. There is considerable pressure on policy makers 
within the Congress and DoD in making strategy and force structure decisions 
with costs in mind. A key question is what will future conflict look like and how 
much resources should be committed to large conventional forces.  
To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow’s 
military, we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies, one of 
which could be conflict with China. This thesis examines the strengths and 
weakness in both the U.S. and China, and uses Game Theory to model conflict 
between the two countries using the Correlates of War data to measure national 
power. Finally, the relative merits of diplomacy and irregular war are examined in 
order to determine the best method for the United States to achieve an 
advantage when interacting with China in the pursuit of national objectives.  
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I. INTRODUCTION, QUESTION AND THESIS 
The rise of China has been documented by many noted sociologists, 
political scientists, and economists.1  The U.S. and China have many interests 
that coincide around the world creating a potential for conflict, and so the stakes 
are high for finding a way for the U.S. and China to co-exist peacefully, working 
through problems without resorting to war. While the quest for peace is the 
preferred aim of policy, it is prudent to discuss the potential for conflict.  The 
central question that drives this study is, “Can the United States ‘win’ a 
conventional war against China and if not, are there offensive irregular warfare 
activities that can deter China while being advantageous to the U.S.” Modeling 
can provide input to policy makers by providing insight into three questions:  1) 
How would the U.S. fare in a conventional war with China, 2), Would the U.S. 
fare better using IW against China, and 3), Is there a combination of conventional 
force, IW, and diplomacy that can achieve U.S. strategic objectives? Finally, the 
models in this study are meant to provide mathematical ‘insights’ into whether IW 
is an essential element of U.S. national strategy.  
The international system is always under pressure. Dominant countries 
attempt to maintain the current economic system that maximizes their own 
privileges, but rising powers are tempted to overturn the status quo in order to 
establish their own privileged system. One key theory of  power transition was 
first forwarded by A Organski in his book, World Politics.2 He described an 
international system in which one or only a few great powers sit atop a pyramid, 
ensuring stability, while rising states challenge the leaders for control of the 
international system. From 1945 to 1990, control of the international system was 
                                            
1 The rise of China has spawned a vast corpus of work on both sides of the Pacific. Two of 
the best, used frequently in this thesis, are Susan Shirk’s China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) and Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth 
(MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2006). Other sources are referenced throughout this thesis.  
2 Ken Organski. World Politics (Knopf, New York,1960). For a work which greatly expands 
and explains Organski’s original work, see Ronald Tammen, Jack Kugler (eds), Power 
Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (Seven Bridges Press, New York 2000).  
 2 
contested between the forces of the West, led by the United States, and 
international communism, led by the Soviet Union. The United States won that 
cold war with the effective dissolution of the Soviet Empire in 1991 and the 
adoption by most countries of free market principles, albeit with varying levels of 
social control on the part of governments. However, in the late 1990s, a new 
player emerged on the global scene through its own market (but not political) 
liberalization- China.   
China has the opportunity to upset the contemporary international 
economy that has largely been the creation of the world’s dominant economic 
and military power, the United States.3 It is in the U.S.’ best interest to maintain 
the current global economic system but China (specifically, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) must continue to expand economically in order to 
produce and distribute wealth internally in order to ensure domestic stability. 
Inevitably, China must exercise power in the international arena in the search for 
greater resources.4  This search for greater resources has been the cause of 
many wars: Rome destroyed Carthage in order to dominate trade in the Middle 
Sea while Japan turned to aggression in order to secure the natural resources of 
Southeast Asia.5 Today China is rattling its military might in the South China 
Seas.6 Power transition is not so much theoretic flotsam.  Towards the end of the 
19th century, England bestrode the globe with unmatched naval and economic 
might, but by the early 20th century, things had changed. Germany had unified, 
with its economy growing larger than England, and had begun building a naval 
program to challenge for mastery of the seas. Two wars for world domination 
followed.  
                                            
3 Robert Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future,” International Organization, vol. 29, no. 1 
(Winter, 1975): 37–60. 
4 Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1987), 8 
5 Kaoru Sugihara, “The Economic Motivations behind Japanese Aggression in the Late 
1930s,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 32, no. 2 (Apr 1997): 259–280. 
6 Carlyle Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” 
International Journal of China Studies, vol. 2, no. 3 (Dec 2011): 555–583. 
 3 
The framework for international relations is configured by the states with 
the power to enforce it. These dominant states seek to organize and maintain the 
system in order to maximize their economic benefits. The British, Roman, 
Napoleonic and Soviet empires were designed to extract resources from the 
edge back to the center.7 The modern U.S. economic empire, although 
predicated on the free-market, does the same. From the Monroe doctrine to the 
latest war in Iraq, the U.S. has used conflict to maintain the political and 
economic system. With China’s need of access to resources to continue its own 
domestic programs, conflict might be unavoidable.8 
A. POWER TRANSITION 
Power transition, a theory of international relations, explains the current 
relationship between the U.S. and China in which the U.S. is the dominant 
nation, and China is the challenger (see Figure 1).9   
                                            
7 I found Michael Doyle’s Empires (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1986) very helpful 
since it meshed perfectly with his Ways of Wars and Peace used later. Also J. Empires of the 
Atlantic World (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 2006) and E. Eisenstadt, The Political 
Systems of Empires (Free Press, Glencoe, IL, 1963).  Of particular interest is Leo Blanken’s 
Rational Empires (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012). 
8 In this I agree with John Mearsheimer’s analysis in Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
(Norton, New York, 2001). Ominously, the economic and information wars which the two 
countries are certainly already engaged in will inevitably escalate to kinetic interaction. Currently 
using the COW data, China is not at 80% parity with the U.S., which Organski and Kugler defined 
as the beginning of transition. For this, see Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger (University of 
Chicago Press, 1980). 
9 One of the best books which describe the U.S. perspective on the current U.S. role in 
international relations is William Zartman, ed., Imbalance of Power: U.S. Hegemony and the 
International Order (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder CO, 2009). The best journal article on the 
Chinese perspective is Alastair Johnston, “Is China A Status Quo Power,” International Security, 
vol 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56. Sources which support China’s inclusion as a great power are 
more disparate. Some of the more readable ones include Xia Liping, “China: A Responsible Great 
Power,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 10, no. 26 (2001), and Zheng Bigian’s, “China’s 
Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 18 (2005).  Also, Yong Deng 
and Thomas Moore, “China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great Power Politics,” The 
Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, Issue 3 (2004). These articles predicate China’s great power 
status on its economic status, less on its military muscle. 
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Figure 1.  Pyramid showing relative positioning of dominant and challenging 
nations; from Organski. 
 Organski accurately predicted this situation, in which the U.S. controls the 
four elements in order to ensure economic stability. These consist of raw 
materials, sources of capital, markets, and holding competitive advantages in the 
production of highly valued goods.10 Between states, the international system is 
comprised of political institutions, economic institutions, security institutions, and 
the rules of conduct between them, which must also be controlled.11  In a power 
transitory phase, there is a growth of economic development in a challenger, 
based on stable territorial sovereignty and a large population.  This leads to 
significant increases in national power for the challenger.  As the challenger’s 
growth accelerates, it will become dissatisfied with international structure and 
division of resources. The resulting conflict is the product of attempts to change 
                                            
10 Robert Keohane, “Theory of hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Regimes, 




the balance of power12 in order to increase economic privileges on the part of the 
challenger, at the expense of the dominant power.  The primary tenent of power 
transition is that the dominant nation does not willingly give up its closely hoarded 
economic and political privileges and challengers rarely are happy with a second 
class status. 13 Inevitably, the two countries will come into conflict over mutually 
exclusive objectives, confronting each other over the current order and ‘spheres 
of influence” (see Figure 2).14 
 
Figure 2.  High Growth/War Prone Zone; from Lai. 
The resulting wars often devastate both nations, changing the 
international landscape. The wealth of empirical support for Power Transition 
theory has created a preliminary consensus among many international relations 
                                            
12 Balance of power is a phrase with a myriad of meanings. See Inis L. Claude, Power and 
International Relations (Random House, New York, 1962) for a good literature review of this 
subject. I have adopted the definition of power to be the ability to influence other nations, and 
since military might has primacy in influence (this is itself a debated thesis), and changing the 
balance of power involves using military force to decrease the military capability of another. 
13 Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 (University Press of 
Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1983). 
14 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1981). 
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researchers that the probability of conflict increases dramatically when two 
countries are roughly equal and decreases comparably when would-be 
adversaries are vastly different in power.15 However, the perceived inequality of 
the system still results in dissatisfaction among all lesser powers and creates a 
desire to change the system. 
John J. Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics presents a 
new version of realism, called offensive realism that posits states will pursue 
strategies that maximize their security at each other’s expense.16  The tragedy is 
that their will to dominate actually encourages conflict. This is because 1) there is 
no central authority to impose order, 2) states, the primary actor of the 
international order, always develop offensive military capability (and the higher 
the aim of the state, the greater the capability), and 3) states can never know 
what other states are planning.17  Mearsheimer’s thesis significantly takes power 
transition closer to general war than previous theorists would hope.  States 
unrelentingly pursue power in order to increase their own security18 and great 
                                            
15 Ronald Tammen, ed, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2000), pg 63. 
16 John Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, Norton & Co. 2001). 
See also Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1981).   The interplay of defensive weapons and insecurity about other states’ aims mean 
that even defensive weapons can appear offensive in nature.  An interesting book that talks the 
application of force, but has some interesting insights about the psychology of deterrence is 
Robert Art (ed) The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 4th Edition (Rowan & 
Littlefield, Lanhan MD, 2004). 
17 Mearsheimer,Great Power Politics, 2001.  
18 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Knopf, New York, 1972) and Ken Waltz’s 
Man, the State, and War (Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, and Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics (Waveland Press, Long Grove IL, 2010). 
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powers19, in this case, the U.S. and China, seek to gain power at the expense of 
others. The dominant power tries to defend the system when changes will benefit 
the challenger, and the undermine change in order to benefit itself.20 
History actually holds many examples of conflict between states in power 
transition, even since 1945 (see Figure 3). The most famous in ancient history is 
perhaps the war between Athens and Sparta. Athens, building on the 
cooperation of the Delian league, created to confront the Persian invasion, 
created its empire of tribute paying and trading city states. Subsequently, Athens 
fought a protracted twenty-seven year war with Sparta and the Peloponnesian 
League over control of Greece. In his history, Thucydides provides the reason for 
this contest: “The real cause for this war was the growth of Athenian power and 
the fear generated in the minds of the Spartans that made the war inevitable.”21 
Other ancient contests occurred. Rome and the Carthaginians and the Arab 
Empires are several that are well catalogued. The long time periods involved in 
power transitions are illustrated by the Roman and Persian empires experiencing 
multiple power transitions, often surviving setbacks with their empires.   Modelski 
called this the ‘long cycle’ of power transition.22 In recent history, Germany and 
Japan both attempted to gain a dominant position against the existing 
                                            
19 There is much literature about the definition of a great power. My primary source has been 
Jack Levy’s War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 (University Press of Kentucky, 
Lexington, KY, 1983) and also, Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics. GR Berridge and 
John Young provide an alternate idea of great power in “What is a Great Power,” Political 
Studies, vol. 36, no. 2 (Jun 1988) who write that “the idea that a great power requires formal 
recognition or ‘general interests’ or an inclination to ‘responsible’ behavior and also rejects the 
view that the demonstration of great military power in war is either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition of being a great power. They conclude that a great power is one whose reputation for 
existing or latent military strength may be equaled but not significantly surpassed by that of any 
other power.” This is the popular idea that ‘influence’ is a power in its own right, not connected to 
any sort of ‘hard’ power. I’ve rejected this notion since, one, Switzerland does not run the world, 
and two, in a greater picture, their definition is subsumed in that put forward by realists. 
20 Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2001. 
21 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (Penguin Books, New York, 
1972). 
22 George Modelski described his long cycle theory fully in his Long Cycles in World Politics 
(University of Washington Press, Seattle WA, 1987).  The journal International Organization also 
produced a special issue on long cycle theory; see International Organization, Vol 41, No 2 
(1987). 
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international system, but both lost. Transition through war is most common, but 
transition can also occur through what Robert Gilpin referred to as shared norms 
and values.23 Great Britain, although on the winning side of World War II, 
declined, lost its empire, and transitioned peacefully, with the United States 
assuming global leadership. Transition through cooperation would usually occur 
only in local hierarchies, when the two countries share common political and 
cultural philosophies. Transition between two countries in different local 
hierarchies would most likely occur through conflict since differing political 
systems and international goals are the driving factors in the development of 
differentiated local hierarchies. 
With the advent of modern economies and strategic reach, empires took 
on a global nature. The Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French and British empires 
took turns imposing colonial rule across much of the world. In the twentieth 
century, the hegemonic competition of the World War period led to the 
destruction of the German and Japanese empires and so weakened Britain that 
her colonies were eventually emancipated. As the speed of communication has 
increased, and thus made the world a smaller place, power transitions seem to 
be occurring more quickly. For example, the Roman Empire24 lasted over a 
thousand years and successfully overturned the contemporary international order 
by defeating the Carthaginians and later successfully defended their own position 
against the Persians. Additionally, one can date the rise of the British to 1588 
and the Spanish Armada’s failure. While devolving the imperial possessions took 
another forty years, Britain’s control over enough material resources to count as 
a great power effectively ended in 1945.  
                                            
23 Gilpin, War and Change, 1981. 
24 I am including the eastern empire after 476, so the inclusive dates are 264 BCE, the start 
of the Punic Wars with Carthage, through 1071 CE, and the Battle of Manzikert where the 
Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes was captured. 
 9 
 
While the thought of war between China and the U.S. is distasteful, as 
military professionals, we must consider it. Most policy makers see China as a 
giant, benevolent ‘Asian tiger’, a larger version of South Korea or authoritarian 
Singapore. Unfortunately, the comparison stops at the incredible economic 
output and geographical position. China’s huge population and natural resources 
will continue to move China into the upper stratosphere of economic capability. 
This economic expansion allows China to devote greater resources to developing 
a military capable of force projection. As this occurs, China will move to dominate 
Figure 3.  Power Transitions among Great Powers since 1945; source 
COW. 
 10 
eastern Asia, which already appears to be happening.25 Beyond the security 
agreements between Japan and the U.S., this groping for resources will bring 
China into direct conflict with the U.S. 
The underlying girder of any conflict in power transition is as mentioned 
above, power. The most obvious and simple way to determine the power of any 
state is too tally up its military hardware, numbers and capabilities, and simply list 
the states, from top to bottom.  The state with more ‘stuff’ wins. This is a greatly 
simplified definition, but generally, the realist school of international relations 
supports this type of definition of power. However, in order to more effectively 
model power transition, the question that must be explored is how the states 
involved create power, that is, their domestic economic situation. While this 
thesis is not a compendium of dreary economic data, I do propose to explore the 
major economic indicators of both China and the U.S. This is because, above all, 
a strong economic position is required to fund all the expensive military hardware 
required to either deter challengers in a ‘balance of power’ situation or attack and 
destroy challengers in the offensive realism of Mearsheimer.  A large economy is 
usually predicated on large populations with easy access to natural resources, 
                                            
25 A great thesis on Chinese hegemonic ambitions from as far back as the 7th Century BCE, 
see Steven Mosher’s Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (Encounter Books, 
San Francisco, CA, 2002). For an excellent look at how China will engage in economic warfare, 
see Peter’s Navarro’s, The Coming China Wars (Financial Times Press, New York, 2007).  Also 
see Aaron Friedburg, A Contest for Supremacy (Norton, New York 2011). Henry Kissinger, a long 
time China Hand, writes about possible cooperation in “The Future of U.S. Chinese Relations: 
Conflict is a Choice, Not a Necessity,” Foreign Affairs (Mar/Apr 2012). Recently, major news 
organizations have begun paying attention to Chinese movements in the South China waters. 
See Jane Perlez, “China Asserts Sea Claim with Politics and Ships,” New York Times, August 11, 
2012, U.S. Edition online and The Wall Street Journal, “The Bully of the South China Sea,” 
August 10, 2012, U.S. Edition online. The news magazine The Economist also has followed 
China closely on this issue. See “Could Asia really go to war over these? The bickering over 
islands is a serious. threat to the region’s peace and prosperity,” Sep 22nd 2012, print edition, 
“Protesting too much: Anti-Japanese demonstrations run the risk of going off-script,” Sep 22nd 
2012, The Economist’ blog, Clausewitz: Defence, security and diplomacy, “China’s aircraft carrier: 
58,500 tons of coincidence, “ Sep 26th 2012, and a short net video “Rising tensions in the East 
China Sea: Avoiding escalation,” Sep 17th 2012, No 18:04 by The Economist Online, explains the 
recent anti-Japanese demonstrations in the context of the Sino-Japanese disagreement about the 
Senkakus islands. 
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and the most dangerous state would be the challenger with a rapidly expanding 
economy.26 
Power, then, is more than the number of divisions and carriers a state 
controls, but the latent capabilities a state can marshal when competing with 
peers. This latent capability is broadly socio-economic in nature. A state’s wealth, 
ability to create wealth, and the fundamental chutzpah of its population are all 
assets in the accumulation of power.27   
In this thesis I will use primary energy consumption by the United States 
and China as a way to measure the economic output of each country. Because 
wealth is notoriously difficult to measure, energy consumption is a simple way to 
measure the relative wealth of a state’s population since it measured the ability of 
the population to harness energy to produce products, both industrial and service 
oriented. 
My hypothesis is that the U.S. and China are already in power transition, 
as China begins to amass global influence through its economic growth and real 
military power. A close examination of China’s growth over the last two decades 
in Section Two and a study of the data from the Correlates of War database will 
allow me to build a game theory model of conflict between the United States and 
China in order to gain insights into strategies for each country. I will take the 
results of that model and determine how diplomacy and irregular war can deter 
China and postpone transition, thereby maintaining the U.S.’ dominant position in 
the international system. 
B. WHY GAME THEORY? 
If Mearsheimer is correct, and conflict with China is unavoidable, then 
game theory might provide valuable insights into understanding the likely 
                                            
26 The effect of population of military power is described the Katherine Organski and AFK 
Organski in Population and World Power (Knopf, New York, 1961). 
27 Klaus Knorr presents effectively simple descriptions of the latent power of states in The 
War Potential of Nations (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1956) and his Military Power 
and Potential (DC Heath, Lexington MA, 1970). 
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outcomes of conflict.28 Since the reality of international relations is so 
comprehensively complex, models may be constructed to simplify the problem 
and the analysis. A simple model can be used to draw attention to factors in the 
situation which might be overlooked otherwise.29 The game theoretic model with 
its reasoning and analysis can be used to construct alternatives to the solutions 
offered in the game, providing a multi-person viewpoint of the how the U.S. 
should deal with China in order to avoid catastrophic conflict. This game is built 
from solid empirical evidence so as the strength and validity of the model 
increases, its analysis might lead to justifiable policy recommendations. A major 
assumption in game theory is that the players are rational. Rational players imply 
that both players try only to maximize their own outcomes. Individual rational 
behavior does not dictate that states will act in a rational manner.30 
The game theory model which is used provides values of combat power 
which are “abstractions of reality”31 and are meant to model combat situations, 
not actual weapons systems, which lies to the right of the modeling spectrum.  
As the spectrum of modeling above implies (see Figure 4), game theoretic 
models will differ from reality, sometimes quite a bit. Just as real combat is 
complex and full of uncertainty, so are models. While many game theorists stress 
the importance of constructing prescriptive, generic models32, modeling conflicts 
based on scientifically defensible data can provide valuable insights.  In this 
thesis, the brief descriptions of national strengths and weaknesses in sections 
Two and Three are important in order to establish real world limitations on 
                                            
28 Some of the oldest proponents of game theory for analyzing international relations are P 
Green’s Deadly Logic (Ohio University Press, Columbus OH, 1966) and Anatoli Rapoport’ 
Strategy and Conscience (Harper and Row, New York, 1965). See also Martin’s “The Selective 
Usefulness of Game Theory,” Social Studies of Science,” vol. 8 (1987): 85–95.  
29 Peter Bennett, “Modeling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond,” 
Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 39, no. 1 (Apr 1995): 19–52. pg 26. 
30 Martin Shubik, On Gaming and Game Theory (RAND, Santa Monica, CA 1971). 
31 Washburn, Alan and Moshe Kress. Combat Modeling (Springer Science+Business Media. 
2009). pg 1.  
32 Bennett, Peter, “Modeling Decisions,” 26 
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national power. Section Five will describe the components of national power in 
some detail in order to develop and justify the equations which will be used to 
determine national power. 
 
 
This model provides policy makers with insights into how to slow or deter 
transition with China. Assuming both China and the U.S. will follow the key 
assumption of rational players, that each side wishes to maximize its payoff with 
the least amount of risk, then game theory might predict the victor in great power 
conflicts as far back as the data can support.  For example, as seen in Figure 3, 
there have been other power transitions in history.  
The game in this thesis is a non-zero-sum game, predicated on simple 
numerical extrapolations of national power between the U.S. and China. Then in 
Section Six, I calculate preferences and cooperation, threats and first moves into 
that conflict. While the basic form of this game presents a fairly straightforward 
matrix that pits power against power, this hardly represents the conflicts faced in 
the everyday world. Problems in the real world do not usually have 
straightforward results. Non-zero-sum games such as this differ from zero-sum 
games in that there is no universal winner takes all outcomes. Instead, non-zero- 
sum games attempt to find a solution that is optimally advantageous to all 
Figure 4.  Modeling spectrum; from Washburn and Kress. 
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players. As solutions decrease in optimal value, the players come closer to a 
winner take all conflict, zero sum game. Non-zero-sum games are also 
competitive in that they reflect real world international relations and changes in 
the international system. In Sections Two and Three, I attempt to demonstrate 
some of the systemic influencers on U.S. and Chinese national power. Players 
engaged in a non-zero-sum conflict have some complementary interests and 
some interests that are completely opposed. For example, the U.S. and China 
benefit from stability, yet both are increasingly seeking petroleum from the same 
sources.  
There are some assumptions I will make in order to reduce the complexity 
of reality. For example, instead of tracking individual technological innovations 
and modeling those interactions (see Figure 5), we attempt to replace individual 
variables with a ‘master’ variable which accurately represents them.  
 
 
For example, in this thesis we model conflict between the United States 
and China. A more accurate model would match like weapons against like 
weapons; for example, our best fighter jet against the best Chinese jet, our tanks 
against their tanks. These infinitesimally scaled models exist at the right end of 
the modeling spectrum. They are realistic, expensive, and time consuming to 
execute in a setting which allows in-depth analysis.  Instead, we use one 
variable, Primary Energy Production (PEC) to represent the sum total of all 
Figure 5  Complex interactions between multiple variables are time 
consuming and expensive to construct. 
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technologies available to the U.S. and China. This allows us to model a match-up 
which is much simpler (see Figure 6).  
 
 
In Section Six, the primary questions to be answered will concern what 
level of side payments, called irregular war in this thesis, will satisfy China to 
move to a position more amenable to the U.S. policy. Since game theory 
stresses the importance of deliberate choices, this second round of games could 
provide profound policy direction. The model in Section Five is essentially a zero-
sum game since we are only interested in a win or a loss by either country. 
However, in real life, there is usually some chance of cooperation, and these are 
non-zero-sum games.33  Since players in games are taken to be motivated by 
preferences for outcomes,34 what would influence or disrupt35 China in its foreign 
policy? Since democracy and human rights are also a stated goal of the United 
States, are there moves that can influence China in this regard?  While there are 
two conclusions that will be drawn from the first set of games in this thesis, it will 
be the second set of games, the cooperation games, which will provide even 
greater validity, since they will take into account human action.  
 Problems with Game Theory? 
Game theory as a tool to analyze the problems of international relations 
saw its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, when social scientists took what was 
                                            
33 Bennett, “Modeling Decisions,” 26 
34 Ibid., 30 
35 The draft definition of unconventional warfare provided by the JFK Special Warfare Center 
at Fort Bragg is “activities conducted to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government.” 
Figure 6  Simplified interactions in complex models. 
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originally a tool for economists, and applied it the complex problems of 
international security.36 Critics have argued that game theory is illegitimate and 
should not be used to model problems of international relations.37 They typically 
allege that its models are “oversimplified, that the theory is inherently repellent, or 
that the whole notion of rational choice is unrealistic.”38 This last point is 
particularly troublesome since it is a relatively short leap to charges that the use 
of game theory is morally unsound since the risks of miscalculation are so high. 
Critics point out that even if the underlying assumptions are plausible, the 
simple matrix format cannot account for a good deal of what is known to be 
important.  Key players, in this case China and the U.S., would react very 
differently in different situations. Things such as culture and historiography 
influence to an extraordinary degree how each will react to others moves. Critics 
claim that the fluid dynamics of crisis management and deterrent brinksmanship 
will cause rapid changes in a player’s preferences. The resulting combinatorial 
complexity will simply be too overwhelming to model. Many players may have 
linked actors and may be simultaneously involved in many issues, moving 
between alliances and states.39 Finally, the intended audience of this study may 
perceive this approach to be too highly quantitative, or they may have an inbuilt 
aversion to anything containing numbers.  
                                            
36 Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Relations,” World Politics, vol. 38, no. 
1 (OCT 1985): 25–57. 
37 The reduction of real world structural constraints in game theory, and the subsequent 
charge that it cannot model the real world is explained in Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neo-
Realism,” International Organization, vol. 38 (Spr. 1984): 236–286. Also, the Use of ordinal 
rankings of preferred outcomes has come under fire because there can appear to be a lack of 
rigorous inquiry. Robert Jervis wrote about this in “Cooperation under the security Dilemma,” 
World Politics, vol. 30 (Jan 1978):167–214. For perhaps the best reading on the limits of game 
theory, see Martin Shubik’s “What is a solution to a Matrix Game,” Cowles Foundation Discussion 
Paper, Yale University, Jul 2012, found at http://COWles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d18b/d1866.pdf and 
Shubik’s “Game Theory and Operations Research: Some MUsings 50 Years Later,” Working 
Paper #14, Yale School of Management, May 2001 found at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=271029 
38 Bennett , “Modeling Decisions,” 27 
39 Peter Green, Deadly Logic (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH. 1966) and Brian 
Martin, The Selective Usefulness of Game Theory. Social Studies of Science vol. 8: 85–95; and 
Anatoli Rappaport, Strategy and Conscience (New York, Harper and Row, 1965). 
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This is not the case for this thesis. The greater part is a summation of the 
conventional power, problems and advantages which both the U.S. and China 
possess. The poli-socio-economic and military sections of this thesis will be 
familiar and comfortable to the vast majority of readers. The use of a 
mathematical theory does not mean quantifying everything in sight. In practice, 
many models avoid the need for much measurement. Describing the outcomes 
desired by the players can be used instead of utility scales. Often, results do not 
even depend on having complete order, but only on broad assumptions about 
what players like or dislike. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of this thesis may be to 
demonstrate the theoretical premise and outcomes of conflict with China. This 
would allow the wider military and policy makers to concentrate on the methods 
Used to achieve preferred outcomes through combat modeling methods along 
the right of the modeling spectrum (see Figure 4). 
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II. THE RISE OF CHINA 
In this section we examine the growth and rise of China as an economic 
power, and its rapidly increasing military power. With its new powerful economy, 
China is riding a resurgent nationalism which demands respect from the world.  
The last dynasty in China, the Qing (see Figure 7), even banned maritime trade 
as beneath the dignity of the middle kingdom, until China was forced open by a 
series of European military incursions in the mid-1800s.  The last dynasty of 
China attempted economic and political reform in an effort to keep up with Japan, 
but the subsequent social upheaval brought about by the transition to a 
mercantilist economy brought on a thirty year revolution. 40   
Mao, the winner of the revolution, closed off China to the world, but did 
intervene in the Korean War, fought with India in the 1960s, clashed with the 
                                            
40 Jiangling Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Texere, New 
York, 2005).  
Figure 7.  Timeline of Chinese Dynasties with PRC and U.S. included; 
available from Asianinfo.org. 
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Soviet Army in 1969, and invaded Vietnam in 1979, before turning back.41 The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) walled itself off from the world and fell 
increasingly behind Europe, the United States, Japan, and even Korea and 
Taiwan.42 Before 1949 modernization had not occurred internally because of the 
great respect for Chinese philosophers like Confucius and Lao Tzu who 
emphasized the middle way; cooperation instead of competition.43 Chinese 
traditions based on these philosophers created deeply embedded cultural 
roadblocks to scientific innovation.44 
A series of defeats known collectively as ‘the opium wars’ convinced the 
Chinese rulers that change was inevitable. From the depths of their despair, the 
scholar Wei Yuan’s influential work The Illustrated Treatise of Maritime Kingdoms 
extolled the West’s advantages: a powerful navy, advanced firearms, and 
industrialized military training.45 Wei argued that the Chinese could copy the 
West’s innovations in order to gain a powerful military.  Wei’s impact was great, 
and the Chinese Army and Navy began to modernize, but at a great price. The 
central government, corrupt and ineffective, could not marshal the resources 
necessary to sustain the drive. Japan was better, and the Meijji defeated the 
Qing in 1895.46 Following this humiliating defeat, radicals pushed through a 
series of reforms that stood to change Chinese society fundamentally, allowing 
for the first time real change in its political and economic structure, but too late to 
save the Qing dynasty. The ensuing civil war would last forty years and 
                                            
41 A very good, concise Chinese military history is Allen Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 
1950–1996, and Taiwan,” International Security, vol. 26, no. 2 (Autumn, 2001): 103–131 
42 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
43 Katherine Dahlsgaard, Christopher Petersen and Martin Seligman, “Shared Virtue: The 
Convergence of Valued Human Strengths across Culture and History,” Review of General 
Psychology, vol. 9, no. 3 (Sep 2005): 203–213. 
44 Richard Nisbett. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think 
Differently and Why (New York, Free Press, 2003). 
45 Peter Mitchell. The Limits of Reformism: Wei Yuan’s Reaction to Western Intrusion.” 
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 6, no. 2. (1972): 175–204 
46 Benjamin Elman, “Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China’s Self-Strengthening 
Reforms into Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865–1895,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 38, 
no. 2 (May 2004): 283–326. 
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eventually lead to the establishment of Mao Zedong’s Chinese communist party 
(CCP) government in 1949. 
A. CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Although the communists made immediate changes such as land reform 
and some initial economic restructuring, the CCP rejected any political reforms. 
Instead, Mao chose to replicate the Soviet dictatorship in China. David Lai writes 
that “in doing so, the CCP created a ‘modern’ government that ironically retained 
the fundamental flaws of past Chinese government.”47 Multiple political purges 
led by Mao decimated the intellectual classes and severely retarded economic 
development.  Grandiose plans such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution were designed to thrust China out of its rural backwardness, yet 
ended up killing as many as 30 million citizens in the largest famine of the 20th 
century.48 In some provinces, the birth rate collapsed.49 At the time, China was 
one of the poorest countries in the world. Economically, it was where the United 
States had been in the 1820s.50  The rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and 
his development policy finally began to lift China out of its self-destruction. 
As those reforms began, the income per person in China was about two-
hundred dollars.51  Deng was determined to link the natural resources of China 
                                            
47 David Lai. The United States and China in Power Transition (Strategic Studies Institute, 
Dec 2011), 42 
48 Izhe, Peng, “Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward,” Population and 
Development Review, vol. 13, no. 4 (Dec 1987): 639. For the single best source on the failure of 
the central planning system to improve living standards, see TP Lyons, “Interprovincial Disparities 
in China: Output and Consumption, 1952–1987,” Economic Development & Cultural Change; 
Vol. 39 Issue 3(Apr 91): p471.  Robert Ash does a particularly good job in explaining Mao’s 
policies during the Great Leap in his “Squeezing the Peasants: Grain Extraction, Food 
Consumption and Rural Living Standards in Mao’s China,” The China Quarterly, vol. 188 (Dec 
2006):959–998. Also, Joseph Chai, “Consumption and Living Standards in China,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 131, Special Issue (Sep 1992): 721–749 and Michael Field’s “China’s Industrial 
Performance since 1978,” from the same special issue of The China Quarterly.  
49 Naughton, Barry, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (MIT Press, Cambridge 
MA, 2006).  
50 Hu, Angang, China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower (Brookings Institution Press, 
2011, ebook). 
51 World Bank, found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6. 
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to the political process. He was less concerned about per capita income than the 
CCP being able to mobilize resources.52  By 2005 the growth was stunning. 
China reported that its economy was 18.4 trillion RMB, which was roughly $2.2 
trillion, about a fifth of the U.S. economy.53 It was enough to move China into 
fourth place, behind Germany (third) and Japan (second) as the world’s largest 
economy.54 By 2009, it’s GDP of $5.4 trillion (in constant U.S. dollars) had 
moved it into second place.55  By 2011, per capita income in China was $5500, 
still far behind the U.S., at $48,000, but the movement is real and has lifted 
almost 400 million people out of poverty.56 That is a 500% increase for the 
average Chinese family in just one generation! There has been no wealth 
creation like that in so short a time anywhere else in the world. 
China has not been content to rely on heavy industry alone to drive its 
economic engine. The CCP is investing heavily in education. Scientific 
production relies on the creation of networks of knowledge sharing and the 
Chinese government is working hard to harness its human capital. Chinese 
universities graduated ten thousand PhD-level engineers in 2009, about 2000 
more than the United States.57 The quality of Chinese education is improving. 
Chinese scientists have developed bio-engineered crops and made advances in 
stem-cell research. China has six universities in the top 50 in pharmacology, 
toxicology and pharmaceutics, and the Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology is among the top universities in the fields of computer science, 
engineering and chemistry.58  Chinese engineers have invented a new civilian 
                                            
52 Chow, Gregory, The Chinese Economy (World Scientific Publishing, Teaneck, NJ, 1987). 
53 National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006 China Statistical Yearbook. 
54 World Bank, found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6. 
55 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Outlook Economic Database (2012). However, 
the World banks massive International Comparison Project; a study that converts domestic 
estimates in national currencies to the U.S. dollar devalued its 2005 estimate of China’s GDP by 
%40. 
56 World Bank, found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6. 
57 CNNMoney, Desperately Seeking Math and Science Majors,” 29 JUL 2010. 
58 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2011. 
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nuclear reactor that is cleaner and safer than current designs.59 China became 
the third nation to send a man to space when astronaut Yang Liwei went into 
orbit in 2003. While the United States remains the largest supporter of research 
and development (R&D) in the world, China’s domestic research and 
development expenditures have grown fast. In 2009, Chinese companies 
became the second largest supporter in the world, investing about 154 billion 
U.S. dollars into research and development.60   
In just twenty-five years, the Chinese people have experienced a major 
upgrading of their living standards. According to the World Bank, since 1979, 
China’s reforms have lifted four hundred million people out of poverty (at the 
$1.25 per day expenditure level)61. Over the past fifteen years, according to 
UNICEF, China has made great strides in reducing malnutrition among children, 
halving its percentage of underweight children, and reducing the death rate for 
children under the age of five by a staggering sixty-five percent!62  Seeking to 
capitalize on the new economy in China, millions of peasants have moved to 
cities, averaging eight percent a year since the early 1980s.63 This equates to 
almost two hundred million people not living in the province in which they are 
registered. This has expanded the urban population from 17.9 percent in 1978 to 
                                            
59 Wall Street Journal, “Bill Gates on the Future of Nuclear Power,” Saturday, 13 Oct 2012, 
and CBS Seattle, “Bill Gates Talking to China to Develop Nuclear Reactor,” 7 Dec 2011. 
60 World Bank or OECD Science Report, 2010. 
61 For many years, the World Bank Used $1 dollar a day as the poverty level; in 2008, this 
was revised slightly upward to $1.25 per day. See 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GAPS. 
62 These amazing statistics are derived from the United Nations organization, UNICEF, 
which compiles comprehensive statistics on children’s health in every country in the world. Found 
at http://www.unicef.cn/en/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=25. 
63 Cindy Fan, Migration, the State, and the Household (Routledge, New York, 2008). For an 
explanation of urbanization and how China attempts to manage it, read Lawrence Ma and Ming 
Fan’s “Urbanization from Below: The Growth of Towns in Jiangsu, China,” Urban Studies, vol. 31, 
no. 10 (Dec 1994):1625–1645, and Frederic Deng and Youqin Huang’s “Uneven Land Reform 
and Urban Sprawl,” Progress in Planning, vol. 61 (2004): 211–236 and Sidney Goldstein, 
“Urbanization in China, 1982–1987,” Population and Development Review, vol. 16, no. 4 (Dec 
1990): 673–701 
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41.8 percent in 2004.64 In early 2012, the percentage of urban dwellers 
surpassed the percentage of rural population for the first time.65 
Population is the ultimate arbiter of economic growth. Without people, 
mines are empty and factories sit idle. The massive internal migrations are really 
a pre-cursor to growth. Even under Soviet-style central planning, collective 
agriculture, and isolation from the world economy, the Chinese economy still 
managed to grow at a respectable six percent annually. But because agricultural 
output didn’t grow and population did, Chinese living standards remained 
stagnant—per capita food consumption was no better in the 1970s than it was in 
the 1950. Deng Xiaoping wrote that “one important reason for China’s 
backwardness after the industrial revolution in Western countries was its closed-
door policy,” and that opening the door would enable China “to make use of 
capital from foreign countries and of their advanced technology and experience 
in business management.”66 Taking advantage of the West’s need for cheap 
labor, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent from 1978 to 
2004 (see Figure 8). Even more remarkable, China’s per capita GDP grew at 
8 percent per year, bringing new purchasing power to individuals.67 It was a 
classic momentum shift, in which China used what the est viewed as a 
weakness, and turned it into a great strength. 
                                            
64 Naughton, Transitions and Growth, 2006.  
65 Bloomberg News, “China’s Urban Population Exceeds Countryside for first time,” 17 Jan 
2012. 
66 The quotes from Deng Xiaopeng are taken from Wu Jinglian’s Understanding and 
Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Thomson Southwestern, Mason, OH, 2005). Deng’s 
personal narratives can be found at 
http://archive.org/search.php?query=Deng%20Xiaoping%20AND%20collection%3Aopensource. 
67 Hu Angang, “China’s Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 1978–2002,” IMF 
presentation, November 2003, New Delhi, India, found at 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/search.aspx?NewQuery=angang&submit.x=0&submit.y=0&col= 




Figure 8. Chinese (excluding Taiwan) GDP and National Income Growth; 
source, IMF. 
The original emphasis during the 1980s was to empower local 
authorities.68  The CCP won over the provincial officials to the liberal reforms by 
allowing them to keep most of the revenues instead of sending the taxes to the 
national treasury in Beijing.69 But beginning in the mid-1990s, the central 
government, worried that it was on the brink of fiscal crisis and national 
disintegration similar to what had caused the Qing dynasty to collapse, started to 
rebuild its capabilities. The provinces were strong-armed into supporting tax 
reform in 1994 that brought more revenues into the central coffers. Soon, in an 
effort to ensure the loyalty of the PLA after the shock of Tiananmen, the PLA 
experienced burgeoning budgets.70  
                                            
68 Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (University of California 
Press, Berkeley, CA, 1992). 
69 Shirk, Susan, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2007). pg21. 
70 G. A. Fowler “World news: China counts the cost of hosting the Olympics; social programs 
are weighed beside image building,” Wall Street Journal, (2008, Jul 16): 12-A. 
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B. THE CHINESE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Today, however, the CCP is beginning to experience the stress of having 
to choose between guns and butter. The CCP must continue to attract 
investment in order to continue the job creation that is the basis of its ‘social 
contract’. While foreign companies are eager to take advantage of cheap labor, 
the government must fund the massive population shifts from the countryside to 
the manufacturing cities. The burden of providing healthcare, education, and a 
clean environment falls on a government that is struggling to provide a minimum 
of these services.71 
Powerful social forces are a risk to the orderly rise of the country’s 
standard of living.  Workers demand better conditions and higher wages, thus 
increasing the costs of production. As costs rise, foreign companies are tempted 
to move to lower wage countries. At the same, farmers from the vast interior of 
China are attracted to the better living conditions in the cities. The government 
which has for many years promised economic freedoms at the cost of political 
freedoms must continue to attract foreign investment. This is a vicious cycle with 
a built in ‘after-burner’ effect in that the Chinese Yuan72 is artificially pegged to 
the U.S. dollar at a very low exchange rate. This government imposed control 
means that dollars can be converted to many Yuan, making production costs 
cheap for American companies. A side effect is that American goods are kept 
expensive, essentially blocking American companies from the world’s largest 
market. The U.S. has brought action against the CCP in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), accusing China of currency manipulation and unfair trade 
practices. Were the Chinese to allow the RMB to rise in response to supply and 
demand, the country would most likely experience a deep recession. The 
resulting social unrest would be seen as a major threat to the regime’s stability. 
The CCP’s ‘social contract’ with the Chinese people is one which is predicated 
                                            
71 Ibid, pp. 12-A. 
72 Also known as the Renminbi, abbreviated RMB, which is a transliteration of “people’s 
money.” 
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on a rising standard of living. Foreign companies are eager to take advantage of 
cheap labor which the government funds by massive population shifts from the 
countryside to the manufacturing cities. The burden of providing healthcare, 
education, and a clean environment falls on a government in which funding for 
these programs has lagged behind the PLA, urbanization, industrialization, and 
even the 2008 Olympics.73  The CCP must manage its domestic spending, 
providing for a widening social safety net, while spending resources on economic 
infrastructure and the PLA. Workers demand better conditions and higher wages, 
thus increasing the costs of production. As costs rise, foreign companies are 
tempted to move to lower wage countries. At the same, farmers from the vast 
interior of China are attracted to the better living conditions in the cities. The 
government which has for many years promised economic freedoms at the cost 
of political freedoms must continue to attract foreign investment.  
After the revolution, social programs were at the bottom of the CCP’s 
priorities. Even after Mao, the reforms of Deng in the 1970s and 1980s were 
committed to economic growth.  What has suffered has been social spending on 
healthcare, education, and safety nets for the elderly. Yet, in the past sixty years, 
the government of China has experienced exponential economic growth. China 
has added about $2 trillion to world GDP, created 120 million new jobs, and 
pulled four-hundred people out of poverty.  
C. CHINESE THIRST FOR OIL 
This explosive economic growth has been fueled by the world’s 
economies’ dependency on energy, both oil and natural gas (see Figure 9). 
Soaring energy demand from China will drive the long term oil market74, while 
China’s natural gas consumption is set to almost triple over the next eight years. 
Energy Business Journal writes that, “China’s natural gas consumption was 
131.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2011, already a steep rise from the 2000 
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figure of 24.5bcm. However, consumption levels are predicted to soar even 
higher to reach 375bcm by 2020, thanks to the country’s desire to increase share 
of natural gas in its energy mix.”75  
 
 
Figure 9.  Oil Consumption in the U.S., China, India, and Russia; source, U.S. 
EIA.  
As the rest of the world’s appetite for natural resources ramps up and 
prices rise, China will not be able to purchase energy on the open market so 
easily and still afford domestic spending. The natural response to tightening 
supplies will be to seek additional domestic supplies which will not be held 
hostage to market fluctuations. This is the reason for the Chinese expansion into 
the South and East China seas, and Africa. This expansion could bring China 
into conflict with the U.S. First, participation in the market by Chinese firms drives 
the price energy up, hurting the domestics U.S. economy. Two, the Chinese 
quest to secure resources via imperialism again reduces the amount of energy 
available to the market, thus driving up prices, and hurting the U.S. economy. 
China is also very active in the Central Asian region, working to bring the 
oil and gas deposits around the Caspian Sea basin eastward. China has signed 
contracts with Uzbek, Kazakh and Turkmen companies over Russian giant 
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Gazprom, and Tajikistan’s parliament has voted to cede land to China.76  The 
Central Asia-China pipeline that is slated to run from Turkmenistan north through 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, before turning east to China is expected to carry 65 
billion cubic meters of natural gas (see Figure 10).77 China sees Central Asia a 
critical to the economic growth of its western provinces, and vital to its energy 
supplies, and Chinese presence is growing. 
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Figure 10.  China is ramping up its oil and pipeline construction in 
Central Asia via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; from 
Petroleum Economist. 
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China’s growth will slow after 2025 as its population ages. Right now, 
China is blessed with a huge working age population, about 70 percent of its total 
population in 2000, which can easily support dependent children and elderly 
parents.78  In 2065, fifty-four percent of the population will be over 60 and only 22 
percent will be working unless the government starts providing incentives for 
people to have large families or opens up to immigration.79  This would mean 
there is less to spend on military expansionism and efforts to dominate the 
resource rich China Sea, as its citizens will force the country to spend more on 
social programs. 
As a developing economy, China has the potential for continued growth, 
eventually becoming the world’s largest GDP. However, without fundamental 
change in its domestic economic policies, this growth would still be through 
cheap exports to wealthier countries. Still, the CCP seems intent on managing a 
steady rise in its domestic GDP at a rate which will surpass the U.S. sometime in 
2016.80 This is important because all of the elements of national power are 
predicated on national wealth. 
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D. CHINESE MILITARY  
 
Figure 11.  International Shipping Chokepoints; from U.S. EIA. 
Security for the energy that China’s economy needs is forcing the country 
to develop a navy. China became a net importer of oil in 2009, just behind the 
United States. China has reorganized its state oil industry into two 
conglomerates. CNPC and CNOOC have become major players across the 
world, prospecting in Africa, Central Asia and offshore in the South China Seas. 
With net imports reaching 5.5 million barrels a day, the international oil market is  
especially sensitive to the larger Chinese economy.81 More importantly, the 
Chinese government is especially sensitive to the oil market. A U.S. Government 
agency, the Energy Information Administration, predicts that 60% of the world’s 
growth in oil demand by 2014 will come from China.82 Necessarily, government 
policies are heavily weighted towards protecting this resource. 
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Chokepoints in the international sea lanes are of particular concern (see 
Figure 11). In 2010, China imported over 50% of its oil from the Middle East. 
Saudi Arabia and the southern African country of Angola together accounted for 
66 percent of its oil imports.83  Hormuz, in the Persian Gulf, is the world’s most 
important oil chokepoint, with flows through the strait accounting for 35% of all 
seaborne oil, and 20% of all the world’s oil. More than 85% of these crude oil 
exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China 
representing the largest shares.84 
The Strait of Malacca, linking the Indian and Pacific oceans, is the shortest 
sea route between Persian Gulf suppliers and the Asian markets. Oil shipments 
through the strait supply China and Indonesia, two of the world’s fastest growing 
economies. It is the key chokepoint in Asia with an estimated 14 million barrels of 
crude a day transiting the strait.85 China’s energy security currently rests on the 
might of U.S. and Indian naval flotillas protecting the chokepoints, but the PLAN 
has been increasing its ability to project naval power.86 
China is also looking closer to home for more energy (see Figure 12).87 
The South China Sea is conveniently close, but developing those reserves bring 
its own geo-political difficulties. Estimates for proven and undiscovered oil 
reserves in the South China Sea range from 28 billion to as high as 213 billion 
barrels of oil.88  That is more oil than any other field except Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela, and could supply China for more than sixty years.89  A recent survey 
                                            
83 Ibid.  
84 U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 22 August, 2012, 
found at http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=p3. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ashley Townshend, “Unraveling China’s “String of Pearls,”“ YaleGlobal, 16 Sep 2011, 
found at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/unraveling-chinas-string-pearls 
87 U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘‘China,’’ May 2011, http://205.254.135.7/ 





found that the South China Sea could have almost 4 trillion cubic meters of gas, 
which could power Chinese consumption for thirty years.90 Japan, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam all have conflicting claims in the area, and there have 
been militarized accidents in the recent past. India is also getting involved, 
stemming from its close relationship with Vietnam and several claims made by 
Indian oil companies on leases in the South China Sea.91 
 
 
Figure 12.  “Nine Dash Map” showing overlapping claims in the South China 
Seas; from The Economist. 
The brewing conflict over the islands of the South China Sea conveniently 
serves the CCP leadership’s goal of creating deeper feelings of commitment in 
its people towards the state. Taking on Japan and by proxy, the Unites States, 
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plays well to a domestic audience excited to see China grow as a regional power, 
getting its way in an area historically considered their own. International laws 
dictate that a country with sustainable communities on disputed islands has a 
legitimate claim to those islands.92 Accordingly, China recently established a 
larger army garrison and legislature to govern Yongxing Island, more than 200 
miles southeast of Hainan. The goal of that move is to allow Beijing to “exercise 
sovereignty over all land features inside the South China Sea,” including more 
than 40 islands “now occupied illegally” by Vietnam, the Philippines and 
Malaysia.93 
The economic boom nurtured in the civilian economy also is enhancing 
the PLA’s military capabilities, as Beijing begins to be able to afford large 
investments into both defense and civilian projects.94 In the past decade, military 
spending has risen ten percent a year, funding projects meant to bring strategic 
reach to the PLA, particularly the navy and air force.95 China is heavily 
dependent on imported energy via pipelines in Central Asia and the sea lanes in 
the South China seas. The pace of military modernization accelerated during the 
1990s in response to moves by Taiwan’s leaders to establish the island as an 
independent sovereign country instead of a part of China.96 Estimates of the size 
of China’s military spending vary widely because much of that spending is off-
budget, but in terms of achieving their goals, Chinese military leaders claim they 
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will have a modern force capable of defeating Taiwan and countering American 
intervention by 2020. 
 
According to SIPRI, a defense research institute, China’s annual defense 
spending rose from $30 billion in 1990 to almost $130 billion in 2010 (see Figure 
13).97 America still spends four times as much on defense, but on present trends 
China’s defense spending could overtake America’s after 2035.98  
Official defense spending ran at an average of two percent of GDP from 
1990, when the earliest good data is available, to 2011.99 This would be about 
100 billion dollars in 2011, but due to the secretive workings of the Central 
Military Commission, the U.S. DoD thinks the number is even higher, around 170 
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Figure 13.  Comparing military spending of China, Russia, and India; source 
SIPRI. 
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billion.100 Accounts normally open to scrutiny in the West, like research and 
development, are kept off budget. So while Chinese defense spending has 
remained steady as a percentage of GDP, it has grown in real dollars, 
outstripping inflation. If the prices of weapons and technology remain the same, 
then China is already acquiring a significant ratio of what the U.S. is acquiring. In 
this light, the DoD estimate is more on the mark, since China, through purchasing 
other countries weapons systems, doesn’t need to invest nearly as much in 
research and development, leaving more for acquisition. 
 The Chinese military started from a dreadfully low point. Wild 
reports put the “people’s army” at two-hundred million under arms, but it 
consisted mostly of conscripted peasant youth eager to escape the hardships of 
rural life. They wore sneakers and were armed with old and barely working 
weapons and went into battle armed with the “spiritual atom bomb” of Mao 
Zedong thought.
101
 The number of soldiers was cut almost in half, from 4.5 
million in 1981 to 2.5 million today as part of the modernization process.
102
 After 
watching the devastating defeat the U.S. and its allies inflicted on Iraq in 1991, 
the PLA realized that its huge ground forces were militarily obsolete and is now 
well on its way to producing a military that has peer capabilities with the United 
States.
103
  Its first phase is now complete, with the modernization of all aspects 
of training for personnel and weapons. The second phase is ongoing, with an 
emphasis on command and control, and technologies to tie all its forces together 
on the modern battlefield. Part of this phase has been the ongoing effort to 
increase the PLA ability to project its force well beyond it borders. In the short 
term, the DoD is focused on Chinas area denial/anti-access capabilities, 
sometimes referred to in literature as AD/A2.  The purpose of AD/A2 would be to 
lock out any U.S. forces sent to respond to Chinese movements against Taiwan, 
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or any attempts to interfere in shipping through the Malacca strait. In the longer 
term, China wants to develop the capability to deploy Task Forces into distant 
lands, and use them as a tool to institute policy.
104 This requires several 
advances, the chief of which is developing the PLA’s separate arms to work 
together as a joint force. Already, it has undertaken joint training exercises with 
Russia.
105
 The greatest expenditure of funds inside the growing PLA budget 
goes to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA Navy (PLAN) which reflect the 
current emphasis on AD/A2 in the Taiwan Strait.
106 The growth in these services 
budgets also reflect how much further those forces must go to create a truly 
integrated joint force. 
Any conflict in the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest trade 
routes, would have global repercussions given the $5 trillion in ship-borne trade 
carried on its waters each year.107 China is preparing to win any conflict, in order 
to ensure its own economy does not suffer any long term distress.  Three goals 
have guided the development of Chinese naval capabilities for the past twenty 
years.  The first is to be able to ‘seal the battlefield’ in the event that Taiwan 
attempts to declare independence. This means that China would attempt to 
prevent the deployment of U.S. carrier task forces into the Taiwan Strait, as the 
U.S. did in 1995–1996. This demonstration of mobile American power has driven 
the PLAN to invest heavily in its own force projection platforms. The PLAN is also 
determined to protect China’s extended trade routes and energy supplies. 
Second, deploy a sea-based second-strike nuclear capability in the Western 
Pacific, which was another lesson learned during the Taiwan crisis of 1995—
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1996.108 China knows it is several decades away from possessing multiple 
carriers, much less able to compete against the ten task forces the U.S. 
supports. It has, however, invested in commercial ports along its sea routes 
through the Indian Ocean. This long term economic strategy came to be called 
the ‘string of pearls’ after a U.S. think-tank report in 2004.109 China denies any 
naval use of these ports, but they could be quickly converted for military 
purposes. They also provide a near complete encirclement of India. Third, China 
wants to move to an information based C2 structure that can effectively integrate 
all three services together in a Chinese version of Air-Sea-Land battle. 
The PLA has transformed itself into a professional modern force. Today’s 
PLA has cruise missiles, submarines, fighter jets, guided missile destroyers, an 
aircraft carrier prototype, and a working cyber warfare capability.110 According to 
the Pentagon the PLA is on its way to having capabilities that “pose a credible 
threat to other modern militaries operating in the region,”111 and “put regional 
military balances at risk.”112 The Pentagon also envisions China as the power 
with “the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S.”113 
The growth of China’s economy has fueled the transformation of the 
Chinese military. As a developing economy, China will be able to maintain high 
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spend rates on defense budgets for some years to come, at a time when the 
United States is struggling to pay for its own social programs. National budgets 
are key indicator of what the state values most through allocations of resources. 
The priority the state places on its ability to project power or social and political 
objectives can plainly be seen.114 In the U.S., balancing social programs and 
power projection is becoming increasingly difficult. In 2011, the Unites States 
paid out almost $800 billion in payments to individuals under various social 
security programs, an amount greater than the U.S. DoD budget. China is 
approaching the point in which its own spending on social programs must grow, 
or it will face ever-rising tensions from an aging population.  
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III. PRESSURE ON THE U.S. 
 The financial strains that China will be 
facing in the future are already occurring in the United States. The American 
social contract, predicated on the pillars of Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid, are all designed to ensure that the poor and old are not left helpless at 
the ends of their lives. Unfortunately, the U.S. social security system faces 
tremendous financial problems as the population is aging.  
Outlays for Social Security benefits will jump by $43 billion, or nearly 6 
percent this year (see Figure 14). That increase includes the effect of the 3.6 
percent cost-of-living adjustment that beneficiaries will receive in January 2013. 
In addition, the number of Social Security beneficiaries has risen by an estimated 
2.5 percent, to 56 million people, in 2012.115 
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Figure 14.  Comparing non-defense mandatory spending; from CRS. 
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Mandatory or “entitlement” outlays will increase by 5.1 percent in 2011 
and by an average of 4.4 percent annually between 2012 and 2020, compared 
with an average growth rate of 6.4 percent between 1999 and 2008. They will 
average 12.3% to 13.3% of the GDP during FY2012 to FY2020.116 These costs 
are driven by massive increases in nationalized medical care, Medicare and 
Medicaid, from around 6% of the GDP to well over 20% -- they rose 5.73% in 
2011. Expenditures in the United States on health care surpassed $2.3 trillion in 
2008, more than three times the $714 billion spent in 1990, and over eight times 
the $253 billion spent in 1980. Without major changes in cost, they will equal 
some 25% of the GDP in 2025.117  
 Even under the CBO’s ‘alternative fiscal scenario’ which incorporates 
current fiscal policy and widely anticipated changes, government spending will be 
absorbed by entitlements and interest by 2025. When the CBO did the same 
calculations in 2000, they determined the critical point when the government 
could not afford current entitlements was 2060.118 Total mandatory outlays on 
entitlements will reach $12 trillion by 2017 yet revenue is only projected to reach 
four trillion dollars, up from two trillion in 2012.119 In short, the declining economy 
and burgeoning mandatory spending on entitlements are creating a situation in 
which the U.S. will not be able to afford to increase DoD budgets without 
significantly increasing tax revenue. 
A. DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 
When the budget crunch comes, the first slice of the pie to be scrutinized 
is discretionary spending. Already, it is smaller than mandatory spending, which 
is spending required by law. At around 35% of the budget, discretionary spending 
funds veteran benefits and the State Department’s international affairs and 
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diplomacy. Income and health security, which are unemployment benefits and 
welfare, are also funded here.  What really affects long term national defense is 
the two percent of the discretionary budget that goes towards education and 
training, and the one percent that funds research and development.120 
 
 
As a fully developed economy the U.S. has a much harder task in creating 
the additional wealth needed to maintain a comfortable margin over the Chinese. 
Walt Rostow presented a theory of stages of economic growth in the 1950s 
which still holds true today (see Figure 15).  
As economies mature and transition to the final stage of development, the 
nation turns to offering  increased security, welfare, and leisure to the working 
force and encouraging enlarged private consumption to include the purchase of 
single family homes and durable consumer goods and services on a mass basis. 
Many nations, driven by their burgeoning material success and the influence that 
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Figure 15.  Economic growth speeds up dramatically in the 'take-off' 
stage, and then slows as it matures. Currently, China is the 'take-off' 
stage while the U.S. is 'mature' with an expected growth of 2 to 3 
percent per year; from Rostow. 
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comes from it will also seek a greater measure of power on the international 
scene.121 The United States did both. Immediately following the Second World 
War, America assumed a position of leadership that it continued to pursue as it 
came to realize the benefits of a global system which it dominated. As living 
standards rose in the 1960s, Americans engaged in the mass consumption 
required by Rostow’s final stage. The economic boom of that decade was built on 
the flight to the suburbs, the mass application of personal transportation and 
everything industry provided. Millions of new homes and thousands of new miles 
of road were built to get people to and from the places they wanted to be. Billions 
of dollars of infrastructure improvements were funded by the federal government 
in order to move goods produced in America to locations all around the world, 
and vast commitments were made to provide social protections to Americans.122 
Following the Second World War, the United States became the factory 
for goods for a world whose economy was in shambles. The great powers of the 
first half the 20th century were destroyed; Britain, France and Germany were all 
losers economically, even forcing Britain to shed its empire in the face of 
economic reality. The U.S. economy kept growing with only two relatively small 
recessions in the early 1970s and again in the early 1980s, both of which were 
brought on by global oil shocks. During the 1990s, economic expansion 
accelerated with unemployment dropping to four percent by 2000, and inflation 
was kept under three percent. By any standard, the 1990s were an economic 
golden age.123 
In the early 2000s, there was a recession as the ‘tech’ bubble, which had 
driven wealth accumulation, popped. This was followed by the crashing of the 
housing market in 2007, leading many Americans to feel that the entire decade 
had been an economic downturn. The causes of the bubbles and subsequent 
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crashes are covered in detail in other sources, but do not change the basic 
calculation that the United States is a mature economy that has progressed 
through Rostow’s phases of growth into a mass consumption society. With the 
resolution of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans are looking for 
savings with which to prop up its social programs, and the DoD budget is 
squarely in Congress’ sights.124 
The U.S. has moved from an industry dominated economy to one that is 
dominated by providing services. This move has been fueled by the combination 
of technology advances with knowledge centric innovations.  The central 
question is whether Schumpeter’s explanation of creative destruction125 remains 
true: Will the U.S. be able to revolutionize its economy the way it did between 
1945 and 2000? Or has it achieved the realization of modernization by finally 
tying social, economic and political change together?  There are some 
arguments that, as the U.S. loses its comparative advantage in manufacturing 
and knowledge centric services to the rising third world; it is retrenching into a 
nationalist economy. Nationalist seek to protect U.S. economic activity through a 
variety of means, including tariffs and trade wars.126 All of this has the effect of 
squeezing U.S. revenues through lower earnings. Combined with the squeeze on 
research and development supported by declining discretionary spending, this 
could have a chilling effect on the ability of the U.S. to continue to develop the 
military systems which dominate the battlefield through superior technology. This 
brings up a key component to this thesis- can the U.S. afford its uniquely 
American way of war? 
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B. THE U.S. WAY OF WAR   
What weighs most heavily on U.S. policy makers is the uniquely American 
way of war.127 The connection between a nation’s military strategies and society 
reflects its comparative advantage. Thucydides, writing 2500 years ago about the 
Peloponnesian War, records that Sparta’s army reflected its authoritarian society, 
while the Athenians, a trading city, was more democratic, as well has 
concentrating on its navy.128 Julian Corbett and BH Liddell-Hart both noted that 
Britain used its powerful navy to bring economic pressure on an enemy, rather 
than commit large land forces to a theater.129 Capitalizing on a nation’s 
comparative advantage is the most efficient way to engage in war, but this 
strategic input evolves slowly over generations of war planning. 
Russell Weigley argues that since the success of a similar strategy in the 
Civil War, the U.S. has pursued wars of annihilation, in which heavy firepower, 
coupled with increasing technology, destroys the enemy. Weigley noted that the 
military fosters an attitude of aggression at all levels of war, which, combined with 
careful planning, is meant to produce a decisive battle, and the belief that 
maximum effort should be expended to overwhelm the enemy. However, Brian 
Linn notes that history only supports Weigley’s contention if one takes into 
account how the United States would like to fight its wars. Instead, Linn argues, 
history shows that most conflicts since the Civil War have been wars of 
attrition.130 With Iraq and Afghanistan evolving into long term counter 
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insurgencies, some authors have even argued that ‘small-wars’ are a new 
American Way of War.131 
If we look at Weigley’s assumption, two facts become evident: 1) the 
United States has successfully waged several wars for unlimited political 
objectives. The Civil War and World War II were both fought to utterly destroy the 
enemy in order that the victor could dictate terms. Even during World War I, 
Pershing argued for continuing the attack until the Germans capitulated, even 
while President Wilson supported a negotiated settlement. Today, there is a 
vocal segment of policy makers who advocate the complete destruction of Al 
Qaida, notwithstanding the difficulties of finding and fixing the terrorists. The 
second fact is that Americans prefer the clean ending of a fight to the finish, and 
have tended to see their enemies in terms of absolute evil. Hitler in Germany, 
Kim Il Sung in Korea, Saddam Hussein in Ira  and Slobodan Milosevic in 
Serbia have all been cast as antithical to American values.132 Americans are 
adverse to the idea of limited war- MacArthur was so insistent on total war in 
Korea, that he was relieved.133 The long war in Vietnam, fought for limited 
objectives, contributed to dramatic social upheavals in the United States and fed 
a strong anti-war group that eventually convinced Congress to cut off funding for 
the conflict. The standard explanation in explaining the loss of strategic goals in 
Southeast Asia is the interference from the politicians.134 The military believed 
that if they had been able to take the war to the North without restrictions, then 
they (the U.S) would have won. 
The reliance on technology and the belief that better technology can make 
war clean and short is the other central pillar of this thesis. Starting in World War 
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II with the Manhattan Project, the United States has sought to harness the 
intellectual power of its scientists to create bigger and better weapons. The 
inability of the American army to beat its enemies in Vietnam contributed to the 
development of guided munitions and stealth technology. As the cost of research 
and development arches ever higher, the military has been content with 
purchasing less of these modern age wonder weapons. The most recent 
development has been the introduction of information technology designed to 
reduce the entire battlefield to easily digestible bits of information, readily 
available to the commander. Billions of dollars have been spent to create these 
new digital operation centers. However, while no one doubts the supremacy of 
U.S. weaponry, and the world was impressed with the U.S. ability to overthrow 
the Hussein regime, technology has not been able to quell the insurgency in 
Afghanistan.  
Lastly is the U.S. commitment to a powerful offensive force, long seen as 
the most credible deterrent against strategic threats. This idea that the offensive 
is paramount runs through all levels of the U.S. military. At the lowest level, the 
ideology of the offensive is written into Army and Marine field manuals, and 
inculcated in junior officers as one of the principles of war. At the strategic level, 
the idea of the offensive becomes transformed into the ability to project military 
force anywhere in the world. A vast amount of the collective DoD budget over the 
last seventy years has been committed to overcoming the tyranny of distance. 
Nuclear powered capital ships allow the Navy to remain afloat for six months at a 
time, while air refueling allowed B2 stealth bombers to take off from Nebraska, 
drop ordnance on Serbia, and return. The Army has vast stockpiles and mobility 
to deploy task forces for years at a time, and the Marine Corps, with its 
expeditionary mindset, although smaller, carries everything a task force needs to 
fight for fourteen days without resupply. Having all this ability may actually 
increase the chance of conflict. Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling, writing at 
the beginning of the Cold War, believed that offensive strategies and first strike 
imperatives could lead states to attack, even in self-defense. This idea of 
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preemption would be codified long after Schelling’s work when President Bush 
announced his national defense strategy in 2002. Robert Jervis and George 
Quester have elaborated that offensive capabilities actually lead to war by 
creating an ‘all or nothing’ mindset in which states are unsure of each other’s 
intentions and so are forced to act. John Mearsheimer recently developed his 
Theory of Offensive Realism which ties all this together under the international 
relations umbrella. Finally, there has been quite a bit of synthesis of this material, 
most notably by Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, and Jack Levy and James 
Fearon.135 
A national myth of offensive superiority has developed since the end of 
WWII, and, since Vietnam, has been carefully nurtured in order to bolster the 
morale of the people and the military. This myth is built around a carefully 
indefinable variable that somehow adds to the hard power of tanks and aircraft. 
The almost infallible belief in this intangible led to the Powell Doctrine136 and 
strategies of dominant conventional forces which seek victory in quick kinetic 
operations. However, if this intangible were real, then added to the absolute 
power of the U.S., then final victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, two minor powers, 
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would have happened quickly. These two cases alone seem to refute the 
national myth of invincible military power. 
The ‘myth of the offensive’ and success in conflicts like WWII and the first 
Gulf War has bred the belief that when the nation goes to war, it goes all in, and 
nothing less that unconditional defeat is acceptable. The country has created a 
vast military-industrial complex to support this notion. Embodied most recently as 
the ‘Powell doctrine’, it is, however, a false notion, since most conflicts in our 
history have not ended with our enemies’ unconditional defeat.  This belief in 
American exceptionalism, particularly in armed conflict, provides a challenging 
obstacle to success in IW. Few of our current adversaries can be identified 
clearly, much less defeated. With this new strategy, the U.S. must accept enemy 
inaction as a viable objective against the irrational and fanatic.  
C. DEFICITS AND THE DOD BUDGET 
The U.S. has been involved in two wars in the last decade. The rise in 
DoD budgets is not just attributable to Iraq and Afghanistan.  The DoD’s budget’s 
annual growth of 4% from FY 2000 to FY 2010 has been greater than historical 
GDP growth.137 This created a bubble in defense funding not entirely to blame on 
the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan. The rise in U.S. defense spending since 1998 
has no precedent in all the years since the Korean War. The DoD budget 
reached its post-Cold War ebb in 1998: $361.5 billion (2011 U.S.D). Since then it 
has rebounded to a total of $613 billion – a 70% increase. This includes 
supplemental funding for Afghanistan, but the portion of the FY12 budget request 
that is unrelated to contingency operations (the so-called “base budget”) is $525 
billion, which is almost 50% higher in real terms than in 1998.138 
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An oft used depiction of defense spending is as a percent of GDP (see 
Figure 17), but this is somewhat misleading.  
 
 
 Percentage of GDP does not take into account the nature of the civilian 
economy or the effects of other government commitments, especially now, as the 
Figure 16.  While DOD outlays have declined as a percentage of GDP, 
the outlays have grown in the federal budget; source, OMB. 
Figure 17.  Outlays of federal budget, including Defense and major social programs; 
source, OMB. 
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U.S. appears to have entered an extended period of economic uncertainty with 
mounting entitlement requirements which are increasing demands and 
constraints on federal resources. If one looks at defense spending as a 
percentage of federal outlays (see Figure 16), then it becomes clear that higher 
defense spending, and thus capabilities, will have to be funded through much 
higher taxes. 
U.S. military and national security spending already places a far lower 
burden on the U.S. economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, 
and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security 
spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP -- in spite of the fact 
the U.S. has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- versus 6–7% 
during the Cold War.  However, at 24.1 percent, total federal outlays in 2010 
were considerably higher than the 20.7 percent they have averaged over the past 
40 years. According to CBO baseline projections, federal spending in the next 
decade will average almost 23 percent of GDP.139 Two other periods have 
marked exceptional increases over the average: 1958–1968 and 1981 to 1985. 
The first of these included the Vietnam War (which was the principal cost driver) 
and then the Reagan effort to expand and transform the force led to increases to 
the DoD budget that were 43% greater than the average. The Reagan build-up 
captured recapitalization costs and a small increase in force size, primarily in the 
Navy. These years saw an increase 57% larger than the average. Notably, the 
percentage rise in spending during 1998–2008 was nearly as great as both of 
these previous two surges combined. This comparison illuminates one factor that 
distinguishes the recent surge:  it reflects both the combined effect of a major war 
and a major effort at force recapitalization.140 
Extracting the supplemental appropriations meant for the wars, it becomes 
obvious that the greatest single driver of increases in the 1998–2008 period was 
personnel accounts, which includes pay and incentives, most notably Tricare. 
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During the 20-year period from 1981–2001, budget authority for personnel varied 
by only a few percent averaging $73,200 (2010 U.S.D) per person. However, 
between 2001 and 2010, it rose 40%. The increase was sufficient to bring total 
personnel expenditures back up to Cold War levels.141 
Personnel costs now consume 45% of the defense budget, totaling $250 
billion in FY12. The Defense Health Program (DHP) in particular grew at a real 
annual rate of 6.3% from FY 2001 to FY 2011142 but the budget only requests a 
1.2 percent increase for DHP, a case in which growth is greater than inflation, but 
which the budget request doesn’t cover.   Since FY 2001, overall active-duty end 
strength has remained relatively flat, hovering around 1.5 million, but the budget 
now supports a force with essentially the same size and force structure as in FY 
2001 at a 35% higher cost.143 Today, the personnel account is comparable in 
real terms to that during the Reagan era, although the U.S. military is only 69% 
as large. Figured on a per person basis, personnel costs are 84% higher in real 
terms than in 1967, when last we were engaged in a large counterinsurgency 
effort. As noted earlier, present personnel policy ensures that long, exhausting 
wars will drive personnel costs sharply higher as the military seeks to retain 
skilled, experienced personnel and attract new recruits. The policy was not 
designed with labor-intensive slogs in mind. Indeed, it evolved specifically as part 
of our recoiling from such an effort – the Vietnam War – and its effects.144 
One component of the new budgetary guidance with conspicuous 
strategic impact is the decision not to maintain an active-duty Army and Marine 
Corps large enough to sustain over an extended period the sort of large, 
manpower-intensive counter-insurgency campaign that has been waged in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  The Future Years Defense Program is counting on savings 
coming from eliminating eight of the forty-three active duty brigade combat teams 
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and six of the Marine Corps forty-one battalion task forces.145 The efficacy of the 
argument that numbers of people count less than capabilities rings hollow in the 
face of the surges of personnel required to implement effective COIN strategies 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument that we will not engage in extended, 
personnel-heavy COIN operations, whatever relief the services feel, also flies in 
the face of the evidence. Major interstate war is declining while intrastate conflict, 
like the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, is up. The Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) shows that since WWII, there have been 372 non-state 
conflicts, more reminiscent of the Iraq and Afghan insurgencies, than inter-state 
wars.146 
The rising costs of sustaining combat power and the ‘pivot’ of the U.S. 
national security strategy towards Asia makes the proposed cuts in the Navy the 
most alarming.  Seven cruisers from the Navy’s current fleet of 101 surface 
warships and two of the Navy’s thirty amphibious landing ships are scheduled to 
be decommissioned. Although there had been speculation that the Navy would 
reduce its number of carriers—currently 11 ships—the budget request for 
FY2013 includes $608 million of the $11.4 billion estimated cost of a carrier that 
has been incrementally funded since FY2007. Currently, there are plans to 
stretch construction of the newest carrier, CVN Ford, over an additional two 
years to spread the cost over a longer period.147 This brings down the annual 
appropriation needed to continue construction, but long term inflationary 
pressures means this accounting tactic brings an increase in costs all by itself. 
The life cycle of aircraft carrier procurement, typically the longest of any capital 
item in the U.S. military’s inventory, is indicative of the problem with rising 
defense cost. A RAND study commissioned by the U.S. Navy on the problems 
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associated with manufacturing timelines between the CVN 71 class and the new 
CVN 78 (Ford) class found that inflation alone could add 1.5 billion dollars to the 
cost of the a new carrier over the acquisition cycle, typically five years.148 
The aircraft carrier is the mightiest symbol of American military might. Only 
ten countries have them at all, and only one, the U.S., has more than two.149  
Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are the largest, most capable, and most 
survivable ships in the U.S. Navy. In the mid-1990s, there were 15 aircraft 
carriers in the Navy fleet; today, there are 11.150 The Secretary of Defense 
recently announced plans to shift the Navy aircraft carrier acquisition program to 
extend, from approximately every four years to five years, the cycle for acquiring 
a new aircraft carrier.151 In the long run, this could have the effect of reducing the 
number of aircraft carriers to ten. The latest generation of carriers, the Ford 
class, is designed to begin replacing the Nimitz class. The first Nimitz class 
carrier to be retired will be the Enterprise, which leaves service in 2013 after fifty-
two years of service. The cost of the first Ford class carrier will be $13 billion, 
with $40 billion dedicated for the total program, including R&D, personnel, 
training, and maintenance.152 The last Nimitz class carrier commissioned, the 
George HW Bush, cost about 6.5 billion, higher than the average 4.5 billion for 
Nimitz class carriers.153 This reflects some elements of the Ford class being 
installed on the Bush in a phased transition. In comparison, the U.S.S. 
Enterprise, the first Nimitz class carrier, costing $450 million in 1962, would be 
$3.3 billion in 2011 dollars. 
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Ultimately, the cost of wars include not only the supplemental 
appropriations that pay for operations in and around a zone of conflict, but the 
cost of developing, producing, manning, and equipping the military capabilities 
needed to execute strategy. For example, since 9/11 Congress has appropriated 
1.28 trillion dollars for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other contingencies, the bulk of 
which has gone to the DoD.154 Instead, one must incorporate the cost of 
personnel, recruiting, pay, personnel training, and training for units, as well as the 
host of other activities often described as ‘normal, peacetime activities’ of the 
DoD. Just since 9/11, the annual appropriation to the DoD for these activities, 
exclusive of supplemental, has averaged just over 500 billion dollars.155 The total 
of those budgets, not including 2001, is over 5.2 trillion dollars. Understanding 
the inflexibility of the U.S. government to gather resources, namely taxes, and 
the true cost of U.S. military capabilities really brings into focus the high stakes of 
conflict with China. The PLA is actively developing stand-off capabilities meant to 
sink U.S. aircraft carriers. The loss of an aircraft carrier represents a huge hole in 
resource availability, one that would not be replaced in the probable course of a 
conflict with China. 
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IV. WHAT IS NATIONAL POWER? 
In order to build a mathematical model using game theory for a conflict 
between the U.S. and the PRC, cardinal values must be derived that reflect 
national power.  John Mearsheimer defined power as the specific assets and 
material resources available to a state156 while others have a more amorphous 
view of power, determining that ‘latent’ power rests on the perceptions of one 
state towards another.  Bruce Russett in World Politics: The Menu for Choice and 
William Wohlforth in The Elusive Balance maintain that there is a sharp 
distinction between how policy makers perceive the balance of power, and actual 
power. Some advocates of this approach suggest, that power is the sum of a 
state’s interactions within the international system.157 Geoffrey Blainey argued 
that war breaks out because states cannot agree on what exactly is the ‘balance 
of power’ and the subsequent conflicts create “an orderly ladder of power 
between victors and losers.”158  In this section, we will analyze and compute the 
value of material factors, like size of military, production of steel, and energy 
consumption, in order to predict the outcome of a conflict. This data makes some 
valid assumptions about national power. 
For our purposes, the definition of ‘power’ is the ability of a nation to 
produce hard power.159 This is a function of many factors. Demographic, 
industrial and military indicators are the most effective measures of a nation’s 
material capabilities. These represent the breadth and depth of the resources 
that a nation could bring to bear in conflicts. Other factors are not identified in the 
data with their own stand-alone values like political institutions, citizen education 
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(and competence), regime legitimacy, and the professional competence of the 
national security elites.160  
The question of primary strategy in a conflict between the U.S. and PRC 
shapes how each country would use its power. This nexus of power and strategy 
has roots that lie deep in the social psychology and cultural norms and values of 
each society.161 As discussed earlier in the thesis, the U.S. currently fields a 
small land force, supported by high technology weapons such as GPS guided 
missiles, stealth technologies, UAVS and carrier strike groups. Conversely, the 
PRC can field a large army, but armed only with conventional weapons like 
tanks, artillery, and older aircraft.162 However, the PRC is closing the gap at 
much less cost to itself. Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) provide a good example. 
The costs to the U.S. since 1945 developing CSG-associated technology and 
doctrine, along with personnel costs, runs into the trillions of dollars. Instead, the 
PRC is buying aircraft carriers from third parties, copying U.S. and old Soviet 
equipment and tactics.163 This ability to ‘free-ride’ on the research and 
development of other nations will lend help to Chinese strategies that rely on high 
technology and force projection weapons. 
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A. HOW CHINA WOULD FIGHT 
In any future conflict with China, this thesis makes several assumptions. One 
main assumption is that up to the present, the PRC military strategies are similar 
to the old Soviet Union’s, namely using the preponderance of conventional 
weapons. Only recently has the PRC begun a transition to strategic weapons 
capable of providing both matching capabilities against technologically superior 
adversaries and force projection (see Figure 18). This modernization is occurring 
in three phases. The first is to upgrade and modernize their equipment; the 
second is to create an elite, professional force oriented on external threats. To 
this end, China is developing their ability to deploy and sustain troops around the 
world, primarily through UN peacekeeping missions and combined training 
exercises.164 The third phase is to integrate all their services into a truly capable 
joint force.165 
Countries plan to achieve victory using their strengths and maximizing 
their competitive advantages. Arguing that resources, whether channeled into 
high or low tech weaponry, are the ultimate arbiter of victory, the strength of the 
PRC is the massive amounts of simple, effective weapons their huge population 
can produce. For the purpose of this study, I assume that the Chinese would fight 
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Figure18.  The Chinese plan is to transition to a peer competitor of the 
United States in three phases. 
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an attritional strategy that this resource abundance indicates, until a point in the 
future when their ability to produce high technology weapons meets and 
surpasses the U.S. 
For technologically advanced countries such as the U.S. and the West, 
there is, sometimes, an inverse relationship between the capability to produce 
and employ high technology weapons and the ability to sustain an attritional war. 
Simply put, as economies mature and diversify, they lack the elasticity required 
to produce expensive, complex replacements for battle losses. In WWII, there 
was a draftee army given relatively simple tasks with simple weapons for their 
missions.  Today, long training times are required for even the simplest military 
occupational specialties (MOS). 
The choice of strategy, either conventional or strategic, is not esoteric; it is 
a decision driven by economics. Stealth fighters and Abrams battle tanks are 
hugely expensive and so are few in number. During the Cold War when it was 
becoming apparent that the Soviet Union was amassing an insurmountable lead 
in quantity of equipment, NATO and the West invested heavily in technological 
advances. Instead of a tank-on-tank battle in central Europe, NATO envisioned 
an Air-Land battle in which Western tanks swept around the flanks of Soviet 
armies while aircraft and attack helicopters blunted the main attack. To do this, 
laser and GPS guidance would ensure that for every missile fired, one Warsaw 
Pact tank would be destroyed. Combat with Soviet forces would be conducted by 
numerically inferior ground forces protected by superior air forces. However, by 
1990, by skewing its economy to production of military items166, the Soviets were 
rapidly closing the technological gap in aircraft. The MiG-25 Foxbat, the MiG-29 
Fulcrum, Su-27 Flanker and MiG-31 were considered some of the best aircraft in 
the world. 
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The Israeli victories over the Arab armies in 1967 and 1973 are often 
offered as evidence of technology giving an advantage over dumb steel.  
However, given the superior training and élan of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
this tells more about the skill of the Israelis than the inferior quality of the Soviet 
equipment.167 The brilliant strategist Edward Luttwak, envisioning a war that 
never happened, wrote in 1983 that “the habit of comparing the most advanced 
Western weapons with Soviet weapons already in mass deployment has finally 
fallen into disrepute. Soviet numerical superiorities must be accepted as 
superiorities tout court.”168 Even a cursory reading of general military histories of 
World War Two in Europe provide evidence of Luttwak’s claim. The American 
Sherman tanks were lighter skinned, with smaller guns than the massive German 
Panthers and Tigers, but numerical superiority eventually allowed the mass 
produced Allied tanks to overwhelm the enemy.169 
These ‘conventional’ armaments still define the vast majority of land forces 
around the world. For another decade at least, it will define the PRC. The 
inclusion of steel in this study is actually more pertinent given the decline of steel 
production in most industrialized countries. While the past two decades have 
seen the first steps of Chinese force projection170, the PLA lacks any real 
capability of putting a combat force beyond its contiguous land borders and 
sustaining that force. While that may change, especially since the PRC seems 
intent on creating a blue water navy capable of securing sea lanes and projecting 
                                            
167 Edward Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 
1983.  
168 Ibid,  pg 44. 
169 Spencer Tucker, Weapons and Warfare: Tanks (ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA, 2004) 
and Duncan Crow’s Tanks of World War II (Taylor & Francis, London, 1979). 
170 The PRC is the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops to UN missions and staged 
impressive NEO of Chinese citizens from Libya in 2009. See Economist, April 7–14, 2012. Also 
see the UN High Commissioner’s for Refugees report, “China’s Growing Role in UN 
Peacekeeping,” Asia Report N°166, 17 April 2009, found at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/49ec24ca2.pdf and Daniel Hartnett’s “China’s First 
Deployment of Combat Forces to a UN Peacekeeping Mission,” U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 13 March 2012, found at 
http://www.U.S.cc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf 
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airpower over any number of combat areas, for the near future, the PRC seems 
only able to fight where it can drive and march. 
B. THE CORRELATES OF WAR AND MEASURING POWER 
At the heart of any science is the compilation of data, and the Correlates 
of War (COW) Project171 has been at the forefront of the drive to make the study 
of international conflict systematic, precise and reliable.172  
Starting in the 1960s, David Singer began collecting previously compiled 
data on wars and national power into his own dataset. He felt that much of the 
preceding analysis was overly simplistic and that the problem of conflict and war 
needed more systematic and rigorous analysis. Previously, there were three 
major attempts to gather all the data concerning wars. The first is Pitirim 
Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937) who identified “almost all the 
known wars”173 from antiquity to 1925 for the major states in Europe. The second 
was Quincy Wright’s massive A Study of War174 at the University of Chicago. 
This was a compendium of wars involving either major or minor states in the 
period 1480–1964. The third was Lewis Fry Richardson’s work, completed 
posthumously, and called the Statistics of Deadly Quarrels175, for the period 
1820–1949. 
Singer’s focus was on the correlates of war, those factors that seemed to 
be closely connected with each other and associated with the occurrence, 
duration, and magnitude of wars. The data set on the attributes of war comprised 
                                            
171 Housed at the University of Michigan here http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. I primarily 
Use the National Military Capabilities dataset for this thesis. 
172 Other good references in the analytical study of war are AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, 
The War Ledger (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980). See also, Kugler and William 
Domke, “Comparing the Strength of Nations,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 19, no. 1 (Apr 
1986): 39–70 and Kugler and Lemke, Eds, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the 
War Ledger (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1988). 
173 Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (Porter Sargeant, Boston, 1957) 
174 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942).  
175 David O. Wilkinson, Deadly Quarrels, from the work of L. Richardson (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, CA 1980). 
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only one part of the project, the dependent variable. Understanding the 
occurrence of war meant obtaining information on other attributes of the 
international system that theorists had argued were the “causes” of war. Principal 
among these was power as indicated by national capabilities, which fell in line 
with the realist theories of international relations. 
In this thesis, I use portions of the countries’ demographics, as well as 
industrial and military measures that are used to measure national material 
capabilities. Other important factors are not included, such as geographical 
location, terrain or natural resources. Landlocked states would naturally 
concentrate their military power in land forces, while island or peninsular 
countries would have larger navies. Geography certainly has an effect on 
economy. For example, landlocked countries develop trading partners early on, 
while island states, like Great Britain, must first develop base economic 
capabilities, and then establish trade and colonies.  David Singer and Paul Diehl 
explained in Measuring the Correlates of War176 that “these facets could 
enhance or detract from a state’s capabilities, but they seem too idiosyncratic, 
state specific, and dyad-specific to permit valid comparisons across space or 
time with the attendant changes in technology and culture.” Similar arguments 
are used for other natural resources, like arable land, climate, and availability and 
there has been some work done on collecting this data.177 However, the COW 
rejects this idea because Singer felt that this data would have a “low probability 
of valid comparison.”178 These data points are, to a considerable extent, 
subsumed by the factors used. Overall, the COW has produced reasonably 
intuitive results. It confirms a convergence of the three pairs of indicators when 
                                            
176 David Singer , “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Data Set on Material Capabilities of 
States, 1816–1985,” in Measuring the Correlates of War, David Singer and Paul Diehl, eds.( 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1990): 55. 
177 Even a brief list of the most important datasets which contributed to the COW is 
comprehensive. For a further look at which sets Singer considered most useful, see, Singer and 
Diehl’s Measuring the Correlates of War (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1990) 
starting on page 60.  
178 Singer , “Reconstructing the Correlates of War,” 55 
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ranking countries with high material capabilities. This reflects that ‘strong’ states 
must have a solid balance of all the capability indicators. For Singer, he found 
that domestic factors such as level of development or elite ideology account for 
little of variance in state behavior; such cross-national comparisons seem to 
serve better for mobilizing public opinion than for explaining the conflict behavior 
and outcomes of the state. He found that such attributes as national 
capabilities—military, demographic, and industrial—carry the researcher some 
distance “down the post-dictive road.”179 
This thesis uses the categories of ‘military personnel’ (MP) and steel 
production180 and ‘primary energy consumption’ (PEC) to determine national 
military capabilities of the nations involved. Steel is important as the primary 
metal of construction, and not only means more tanks and artillery, but steel 
production also indicates a strong economy based on vigorous domestic 
industries. Many economists argue that it is no longer a valid indicator of 
industrial activity. However, this study concludes that “the downward trend 
primarily characterizes the manufacture of durable goods and represents the 
passage from one state of development (heavy industrialization and consumer 
durables) to another (computers, information processing, and other ‘high 
technology.’)181 This would indicate that a decline in the production of steel in 
advanced economies is made up in PEC, which is then put into advanced 
consumer goods such as information technology. 
                                            
179 Ibid, 55. 
180 Up to 1890, iron was also included. 
181 National Material Capabilities Data documentation, 38. 
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C. MEASURING CONVENTIONAL POWER 
 
 Military personnel are regular, active duty troops under the command of 
the national government (see Figure 19). This excludes reserves because the 
mobilization of reserves has a negative effect on industrialization, since those 
reservists are accounted for as workers in the industrial base first. Military 
personnel also exclude foreign military forces, semi-autonomous irregulars, and 
insurgent troops. 
Both Mearsheimer and Luttwak stress the importance of heavy industry (of 
which steel production is a good indicator) to creating a significant land army 
capability (see Figure 20).  
Figure19.  Active duty military personnel have been dropp.ing in the all major 
nations; source COW. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, I have taken steel production and added 
that raw number to military personnel. This presents the problem of ‘adding 
apples and oranges.’  In order to remove this problem and to develop a unit-less 
composite military capability (CMC), the absolute annual values for each country 
in the latest year for which data is available (2008) are summed, then converted 
to a share of the sum of the international system. In the interest of simplicity, I 
have reduced ‘the world’ to a manageable population of the ten major countries 
in the international system, as measured by total GDP.182 Those countries are 
the United States, China, Japan, Germany, the UK, Brazil, France, Italy, and 
Russia. I have also included India. (see Figure 21). Although India was not in the 
top ten in 2011 (India was number eleven; Canada was number ten), it’s physical 
size, population, and quickly liberalizing market economy makes it too important 
in the state system to ignore. 
                                            
182 IMF World Economic Outlook 2011. 
Figure 20.  Steel production, a reliable indicator of economic strength, has 




All the major theorists mentioned in Section One have used total 
population size as an indicator of potential national power. I did not use total 
population. While a state with a large population can have a larger army, 
maintain its home industrial capacity during times of war, and absorb losses 
easier than a state with a smaller population, I have included this data in primary 
energy consumption because I have already pulled out the regular military 
forces, and what is left can be considered as part of the industrial capacity 
available to the nation. Similarly, urban population has non-material factors which 
enhance its importance. Societal organization and social services are associated 
with higher education standards and life expectancies that contribute to higher 
levels of industrialization and industrial capacity.  For these reasons, I am 
including the categories of total population and urban population into PEC, since 
energy is a primary product of industrialization. 
Figure 21. The U.S. has the largest GDP in the world, followed by China, then 
Japan, Germany; source, IMF. 
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D. MEASURING STRATEGIC POWER 
Primary Energy Consumption (PEC) is substantially the product of all 
other factors of national industrial capabilities. The greater the energy 
consumption (and predicated energy production), the larger the potential 
manufacturing base of an economy. This leads to a larger economy, and 
subsequently, more wealth. Because the trend in state vs. state requires greater 
and more complex weapons, PEC can be considered an indicator of high 
technology weapons. For example, China is rapidly closing the gap between 
itself and the U.S. in primary energy consumption, indicating that China will soon 
be able to close the technological gap on which the U.S. has predicated its win 
scenario versus China in any conflict (see Figure 22).   
 
 
E. STRATEGIC AND LAND WAR PROBABILITIES 
For this thesis, in order to build a simple 2 x 2 game, I will divide U.S. and 
Chinese military strategies into either strategic or conventional. Strategic plans 
Figure 22.  Primary Energy Consumption is used as an indicator of a 
country to produce the high technology weapons used in strategic warfare; 
source, COW. 
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utilize air power, long range stealth and aircraft carriers, drones and heavy 
informational warfare, and other ‘high technology’ systems. The values for PEC 
derived from the COW are what we use to indicate the ability of the country to 
develop and produce these systems. In order to develop a probability of a ‘win’, 
we can look at previous uses of high technology in armed conflict. Since the 
advent of flight, there have been sixteen instances of a country attempting to use 
strategic airpower to coerce another country into a course of action.183 In seven 
of these, that effect was achieved.184 However, in nine cases the strategic 
bombing failed. In order to bring more clarity to this study, we focus on U.S. air 
campaigns since 1945. We find that out of seven attempts, air power was 
successful only three times. Since we assume that strategic bombing 
encompasses the PEC of a country (above), we can create a rough probability 
for the success of an air campaign. 
 U.S. bombs Germany185 = unsuccessful 
 U.S. bombs Japan186 = successful  
 U.S. bombs North Korea187 = unsuccessful 
                                            
183 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 99. Also, Benjamin Lambeth’s The 
Transformation of Air Power (RAND, published in book form by Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
NY, 2000) describes the arc of airpower, from failure early in Vietnam, to successfully  forcing the 
North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table, to the Air War over Kosovo in 1999. 
184 Robert Pape has written long and hard on the effects of airpower.  See his Bombing to 
Win (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY 1996), as well as his numerous journal articles. 
185 Conrad Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II 
(University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 1993). 
186 Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (Yale 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 198). Also, Bill Gunston, History of Military Aviation (London: 
Hamlyn, 2000) and Edwin Hoyt, Carrier Wars: Naval Aviation from World War II to the Persian 
Gulf (New York,McGraw Hill, 1989) and William Murray, War in the Air 1914–1945 (London: 
Cassell Publishing, 1999). Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1985) and David Wegg, Wings Over the Sea (New York: Arco 
Publishing, 1979). 
187 James Grahn and Thomas Himes, “Air Power In the Korean War,” Air Command and 
Staff College Air University, DTIC, found at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA398753 and Conrad Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–
1953 (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2001). Walter Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A 
History of the U.S. Air Force 1947–1997 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997) and Conrad Crane, 
American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950–1953 (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 
2000). Robert Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 
History, 1981 and finally, Dennis Showalter, “The First Jet War.” Military History Quarterly, (Fall 
1996):66–76 
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 U.S. bombs Vietnam (Linebacker)188 = successful (North Vietnam did 
return to negotiating a permanent settlement after the air offensive began.) 
 U.S. bombs Iraq (1991)189 = unsuccessful 
 U.S. bombs Serbia190 = successful 
 U.S. bombs Afghanistan191 =unsuccessful 
There have been ten wars involving at least one of the great powers (as 
defined earlier) over the last two centuries.  Each time, the land campaigns have 
proved decisive, even though many had attendant naval or air campaigns. For 
example, in October of 1805, Lord Nelson and the British fleet won a famous 
battle at Trafalgar, sinking or capturing 21 of 41 ships of the combined French 
and Spanish fleets, but that naval defeat had no effect on Napoleon’s victory over 
a combined Prussian and Austrian army at Austerlitz.192 The result of the U.S. 
effort in Afghanistan remains unclear. The material factors of the countries 
involved in this strategy game can be computed from the carefully gathered data 
in the Correlates of War dataset.193 Since 1945, the record of land combat has 
                                            
188 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam(Free 
Press, New York, 2006). See also Robert Pape, “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam,” 
International Security, vol. 15, no. 2 (Autumn, 1990): 103–146. Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air 
Power and Coercion in War (Cornell University Press, Itaca, NY, 1996) is a longer dissertation of 
this article.and Donald Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam (University Press of 
the Pacific, Honolulu, HI, 1988). Dave Palmer’s Summons of the Trumpet (Presidio Press, New 
York, 1995) particularly Chapter 2 on Operation Rolling Thunder provides perspective on the 
policies behind air power in Vietnam.  
189 Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, Smithsonian Books, 
Washington, DC, 1997 and Eliot Cohen, “The Mystique of Air Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 
1 (Jan-Feb 1994): 109–124. 
190 Robert Pape, “The True Worth of Air Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 2 (MAR/APR 
2002): 116–130. For an alternative perspective see Grant Hammond, Myths of the Air War over 
Serbia, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000 and Michael O Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia: The 
Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Air University Press, 1997) and finally, Martin Andrew, 
“Revisiting the Lessons of Operation Allied Force,” Air Power Australia Analysis, 2009, located at 
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009–04.html 
191 The short bombing campaign prior to the introduction of ground troops was unsuccessful 
in defeating the Taleban, not least because the Taleban did not have any targets of value whose 
destruction would induce them to leave. 
192 Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2001. 
193 Correlates of War. http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and 
John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” in 
Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage): 19–48. Also see Singer, J. 
David (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 
1816–1985” International Interactions, 14: 115–32. 
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been more mixed. In this case, we will look at both U.S. and Chinese 
interventions in order to determine the probability of a land win. 
 
 1) U.S. in Korea = unsuccessful194 
 2) China in Korea = successful195 
 3) U.S. in Vietnam = unsuccessful196 
 4) Chinese-Soviet border incident (1969)197 = successful 
                                            
194 MacArthur’s final directive from the United Nations before the Chinese entered the war 
was to unify the peninsula, hence land operations in Korea can ultimately be deemed to be 
unsuccessful. See Allen S. Whiting’s “China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to enter the Korean 
War, (RAND, Santa Monica, CA 1960) Roy Aplleman, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout 
in Korea, 1950 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987) and also Appleman’s 
Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950 (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1990). Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950–53 (New 
York: Doubleday, 1987) Mossman, Billy C. Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951. U.S. Army 
in Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990). Stanton, 
Shelby. America’s Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989). 
195 “South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu” (June/November 1950). U.S. Army in Korea. 
(Washington, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1961). Marshall, S. L. A., The River and the 
Gauntlet: November 1950, the Defeat of Eighth Army (Nashville, Tenn.: Battery Press, 1987). 
Allen Whiting, “China’s Use of Force,” International Security. vol. 26. no. 3 (Autumn 2001):103–
131. George, Alexander, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its 
Aftermath (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969) and Allen Whiting, China Crosses The 
Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1960). 
Especially part three of Jian Chen’s, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation (Columbia University Press, New York, 1994). Finally, Hao Yufan and 
Zhai Zhilai’s, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly, 
vol. 121 (Mar 1990):94–115. 
196 While there were only a few tactical defeats of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the fact remains 
that the U.S. purpose for going to war was to defeat the spread of communism into South 
Vietnam and as a strategic goal, the U.S. failed to reach it. See Conrad Crane’s Avoiding 
Vietnam: The U.S. Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. One 
of the first texts which outlined the defeat of U.S. strategy in Vietnam is William Corson’s The 
Betrayal (Norton, New York, 1968). The most succinct summary of U.S. failure in Vietnam is 
George Herring’s “America and Vietnam: The Unending War,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 104 (1990–
1992). Based on first hand interviews, British authors Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrief 
wrote a fascinating book, Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam (Scholar 
Press, New York, 1978).  Finally, retired Army officer Paul Yingling writes a stinging rebuke of 
U.S. Generals in Vietnam in his “Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces Journal, May, 2007. 
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 5) China in Vietnam198 (1979) =unsuccessful  
 6) U.S. in Iraq (1991)199 =successful 
 7) U.S. in Afghanistan (2001)200 = inconclusive (=unsuccessful) 
 8) U.S. in Iraq (2003)201 = successful 
  
Since no country prepares, funds, and deploys its military to achieve 
inconclusive results, as in the cases of Korea and Afghanistan, those conflicts 
can largely be seen as unsuccessful. In order to determine the probabilities of 
success, we can find that land campaigns were successful three times, and 
unsuccessful four times. This ratio produces a value for the probability of a 
conventional force win in a conflict between the U.S. and China which will be 
used in the formula to derive total national power. 
                                                                                                                                  
197 There are few synthesized historical documents on the Chinese Soviet border conflict 
and so primary documents provided much of the background for this assumption. The best 
repository is the National Security Archive, located at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/.  Thomas Robinson provides a succinct 
summary of the conflict with his “Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the 
March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (Dec 1972):1175–
1202 and has a slightly longer document which includes a game theory matrix on the Sino-Soviet 
clash (The Border Negotiations and the Future of Sino-Soviet-American Relations, RAND Corp, 
Santa Monica CA, 1971, located at http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P4661.pdf) and Yang 
Kuisong, “The Sino Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American 
Rapprochement,” Cold War History, vol. 1, no. 1 (Aug 2000): 21–52. Colonel (ret.) Donald Marks’, 
“The U.S.SURI River Incident As A Factor in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Air University Review, Jul-
August 1971, found at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1971/jul-
aug/marks.html provided perspective on how the clashes affected Chinese perceptions of power. 
198 King V. Chen(1987):China’s War With Việt Nam, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 
University. 1979, and Allen Whiting, “China’s Use of Force,” International Security, vol. 26. no. 3 
(Autumn 2001):103–131, and MacFarquhar, Roderick (1991).  
199 Atkinson, Rick Atkinson, Crusade: Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Houghton 
Mifflin, New York, 1993) for an overall picture of the first Gulf War. For more in depth analysis, 
read Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1992) and 
Michael Knight’s Cradle of Conflict (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005). 
200The original objective in Afghanistan was the defeat of Al Qaeda and the ouster of the 
Taleban (see President Bush’s address to Congress on 20 Sept 2001 at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bus.haddress_092001.html) and the two following 
references for the decline in the situation on the ground: “The Situation in Afghanistan,” Hearing 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 Mar 2011, ebook, U.S. GPO, Washington, DC, 
2012 and “Countering the threat of failure in Afghanistan,” Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, ebook, U.S. GPO, Washington, DC, 2009. There are myriad popular works on the 
troubles ISAF has in Afghanistan and the ‘moving of the goal posts’. 
201 Rick Fawn, The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder CO, 2006) and Terrill Andrews, Strategic Effects of the conflict with Iraq (Strategic 
Studies Institute, Carlisle PA, 2003). Also Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 2004). 
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F. THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM WITH CHINA 
China has been able to significantly reduce its defense expenditures 
through ‘free-riding’ weapons and technology research by Western nations.202 
Since the only purpose of power is to secure the state against existential threats, 
those threats which can destroy the state, the Chinese military must prepare to 
meet strength with strength.  Militaries are imitative, which helps to explain why 
the Chinese are investing in a nuclear navy, with submarines and their first 
aircraft carrier. The old Ukrainian carrier Varyag, has been refitted in the Chinese 
port city of Dalian. The Chinese navy has also purchased Russian-developed 
catapult and arrested recovery technology from the Ukraine. They are also 
                                            
202 Michael Horowitz describes this phenomenon on a much wider scale, including non-state 
actors in this study, The Diffusion of Military Power (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 
2010). 
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developing a guided missile capable of destroying ships out to a range of 2400 
kilometers.203 
This strategic, high technology capability has not been tested in actual 
combat, so the probability of a Chinese strategic win cannot be based on simple 
ratios of success to failure. However, the probability problem must be addressed. 
The probability won’t be zero, because China has some capability, so we set it at 
0.1. This represents a capability and it provides a good starting point for our 
model of Chinese strategic power, since it logically follows that it will only 
increase.  
                                            
203 The problem with Chinese companies and state companies reverse engineering western 
technology, buying the systems outright, and simply stealing them in violation of international 
trade agreements has a long history. Most notably, the Report of the Select Committee On U.S. 
National Security And Military/Commercial Concerns With The People’s Republic of China found 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/content-detail.html which was the 
product of a two year investigation that found China had stolen design and launch data on the 
U.S.’ most advanced nuclear weapons, but also found that the technology theft was not isolated, 
but was the results of decades of intelligence operations. Also, the Department of Commerce’ 
report, U.S. Commercial Technology Transfers to The People’s Republic of China, 1999 found 
here 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/defmarketresearchrpts/uscommerci
altechnologytransferstopeoplesrepofchinafinal.pdf details the long history of Chinese policy which 
is meant to copy technology from western nations in order to facilitate their own domestic 
research and development. Other notable reports are Shirley Kan, “China: Possible Missile 
Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy – Actions and Chronology, Congressional 
Research Office(CRS), 2001, and another CRS report in 2001 detailing the U.S./PRC aircraft 
collision over the island of Hainan, found here 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30946_20011010.pdf indicates that some sensitive electronic 
surveillance equipment could be reverse engineered. Most disturbingly, however, is the third 
party sales of advanced missile technology to China, who is rapidly increasing their ability to fight 
at ‘stand-off’ range, with long range cruise and anti-air missiles, which, when combined with their 
nuclear subs and carrier technology could defeat U.S. Sixth fleet interventions in the South China 
Sea. For more, look at Bussert, James C. Bussert, “China Copies Russian Ship Technology For 
Use and Profit” Signal vol. 62. no. 10 (Jun 2008), 80–83. Clayton, Mark, Top 7 U.S. technologies 
China, other nations want to steal The Christian Science Monitor [Boston, Mass] 04 Nov 2011. 
Gary Milhollin and Jordan Richie. “What China Didn’t Need to Steal,” New York Times 05 May 
1999: 25. Greg Mastel, “The art of the steal: How U.S. technology is getting hijacked--And what 
we should do about it,”The Washington Post 19 Feb 1995: C3. Russia/China: Arms sales pose 
dilemma for Moscow Oxford Research Daily Brief Service. (Dec 20, 2010). Perrett, Bradley, 
“Chinese Copies,” Aviation Week & Space Technology Vol. 165, no. 19 (Nov 13, 2006):44. 
Edward T. Pound. “Explosive Issue: U.S. Sees New Signs Israel Resells Its Arms To China, 
South Africa --- A Lack of Export Approvals For Technology Is Found; Missiles, Bombs and Radar 
--- Israel Denies Any Violations,” Wall Street Journal 13 Mar 1992: PAGE A1  
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G. FORMULAS FOR MODELING 
In order to develop values for how the U.S. and PRC would wage war, the 
following formula could be used, where energy consumption is the predictor of 
strategic power use but is divided by the amount of emphasis a commander 
would give that particular type of warfare. For example, a commander would 
probably not have 100% of a country’s PEC available for strategic warfare since 
PEC also produces televisions, cars, computers and iPads.  So an assumption is 
made by dividing the total PEC by the amount available for military operations, in 
this case, designated with as weight of effort (W). Similarly, the whole value of 
Composite Military Capability (CMC), our measure of conventional military 
power, would not be available due to the competing defense and operational 
requirements elsewhere. The expected value would then equal the sum of 
strategic power multiplied by the probability of a strategic win (developed 
previously above) and conventional power multiplied by the probability of a 
conventional win. Traditionally in game theory, this may be represented 
mathematically as (see Figure 23): 
 
where we are summing the value of the two kinds of power, multiplied by the 
probability of a win through the use of each kind of power. In other words (see 
Figure 24)204: 
                                            
204 Bruce Beuno De Mesquita pioneered the use of rational choice behavior and utility theory 
in his work The War Trap (Yale University Press, New Haven CT, 1981.) 
Figure 23. Expected value 
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H. CHINA’S MOST DOMINANT STRATEGY 
 
In order to determine the value of the PRC military strategies, the values 
for PEC and CMC are inserted into the model, in this case, the expected value of 
a strategy that is weighted for high technology, strategic power (HT) at .60 and 
conventional forces/power (L) at .40, is 66.8 (see Figure 25). This actually will be 
the PRC’s most dominant military strategy. Unlike the U.S., China has not 
engaged in strategic warfare, so there is no probability of a strategic win which 
can be applied to China’s use of strategic power. However, an application of the 
‘free-rider’ principle would allow it at least a low probability of a win, in this case, 
a value of .1. The value of the function, 66.8, will be used to game a conflict 
between the U.S. and China, using these strategies. In our game, we are only 
using four strategies each. In theory, the formula can be repeated using different 
values in the sub-components of the formula. At the end this section, following 
Figure 24. Deriving expected value for modeling U.S./China conflict. 
Figure 25.  China's most dominant strategy. 
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the game matrix, this will be shown. Other simple strategies for the PRC can also 
be evaluated. In this case, conventional-only conflict produces a value of the 
function of 46.0 (see Figure 26). Conversely, a strategy of only high-tech 
strategic weapons would produce a value of 1.06 (see Figure 26). A strategy 
which gives a .60 weight to the CMC and .40 to strategic weapons produces a 





Figure 27.  PRC value for a strategic strike only. 




I. THE U.S. DOMINANT STRATEGY 
For complex economic reasons, the best strategy for the U.S. to follow in 
any conflict would be a surprise, high intensity attack with its strategic weapons. 
Stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned drones, both attack and 
reconnaissance offer the best chance of a decisive, and most importantly, quick 
knock out. The risk is an air war of longer duration; the losses to these very 
expensive weapons systems could not be easily replaced. Conversely, a strategy 
of attrition with a large field army is the worst option. Because of the high cost of 
the U.S. way of war205, the military cannot quickly replace losses, either in 
material or highly trained soldiers, nor can the U.S. economy sustain a long 
attritional war without converting the economy to ever greater degrees of war 
                                            
205 The way the U.S. prefers to fight, relying on technology, heavy firepower, and large 
massed formations has been well documented in sources like Russel Wiegley’s The American 
Way of War (Macmillan, New York, 1973) Richard Locke-Pullan’s U.S. Intervention Policy and 
Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq (Routledge, New York, 2006) Thomas Mahnken’s 
Technology and the American Way of War (Columbia University Press, New York, 2008) and 
finally, Jack Snyder’s The Ideology of the Offensive (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1984). 
Figure 28.  Value of a conventional strike only 
by the PRC. 
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production through government policies, mandates and heavy taxation.206 U.S. 
military strategy of conventional forces (L) weighted at .60 and high technology 
weighted at .40 produces a value of 24.8 (see Figure 28) which is the U.S.’ most 
dominant strategy.  
 
 
Limiting the conventional and strategic forces (in this model represented 
as percentages of conventional and strategic power) available to a commander 
represent very real policy limitations in in modern war. Reversing the weights of 
effort for the two parts of the strategy, in which land forces are weighted more 
heavily, produces a value of 24.8 (see figure. 29). U.S. military strategy of high 
technology (HT) produces an expected value of 6.0 (see Figure 30). A U.S. 
strategy of only using conventional forces is the least desired military strategy as 
it produces a value of only 5.92 (see figure. 31). 
                                            
206 Iraq and Afghanistan, Vietnam. See Richard Lock-Pullan, U.S. Intervention Policy and 
Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq (Routledge, New York, 2006) and this idea springs from 
the intersection of economics and technology- as the American military develops greater 
capabilities, those capabilities incur greater costs- to continue with the ‘tank’ example, a Sherman 
costs about $400,000, adjusted for inflation, while an M1A2 Abram tank coast about $6 million, 
but the capabilities have increased- the range of the Sherman’s main gun was about 1000 meters 
while the Abrams has been extended to 2,500 meters, exclusive of new NLOS ammunition. Paul 
A.C. Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945 
(University of Kansas Press, Manhattan, KS, 2004). 
Figure 29.  The US' highest expected value, combining both conventional 












Figure 30.  US expected value weighting strategic systems heavier than 
conventional forces. 
Figure 31.  Value of strategic power for US. 
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J. STRATEGIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 
 These simple formulas, derived from the carefully collected COW 
data provide a single numerical value for each of the four strategies the U.S. or 
PRC would use in this simplified model.  Convert the competitive advantages 
into strategies in order to construct a simple matrix.  According to Mearsheimer 
and Luttwak207, significantly higher numbers of military personnel would confer a 
conventional power advantage, while PEC confers a technology (stealth fighters, 
GPS missiles, UCAVs) advantage. 
The best purely military strategy for the U.S. to follow would be a war in 
which only high technology weapons were used to fight a strategic war. On the 
other hand, the PRC has a definite advantage in conventional forces, as 
indicated by their high CMC. Mathematically, a matrix of strategies would 
produce a ‘pure strategy.’ In other words, in a situation defending Taiwan, the 
U.S. would probably succeed in defeating the PRC. However, if the PRC chose 
to invade Central Asia with a land army, the U.S. would lose.  For example, the 
time it would take the U.S. to move a land-based JTF into Central Asia would be 
much longer than the PRC. For the U.S., the best strategy is an all-out strategic 
war because of the immense advantage, and less risk. I label this strategy 
                                            
207 Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics (Norton, 2001) and Edward Luttwak, The Grand 
Strategy of the Soviet Union (St. Martin’s Press, 1983). 
Figure 32.   Conventional power value for US. 
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U44. U33 is the second best strategy is surprise strategic attack with some land 
forces entering the battle ‘in-stride’. The element of surprise is again high, but 
tempered because of the need for defense of APODs and SPODS close to the 
areas of potential land campaigns. 
A worse strategy is a long build-up period for land forces, with a strategic 
attack at a pre-determined point, most likely when land combat power reaches a 
point when the commander feels he could effectively defeat a spoiling attack. 
However, the long delay in initiating an attack could result in the enemy creating 
formidable defenses, further reducing the long term viability of conventional 
forces. Additionally, the larger force and longer lead time increases the costs of 
the conflict, both in absolute terms and in future economic output. This strategy is 
labeled U22. 
The worst strategy for the U.S. is one which uses only conventional 
power. This strategy is labeled U11 and represents a strategy of attrition, in which 
the initial elements of surprise (strategic attack) and shock (land attack) are lost. 
Because of the high cost of the U.S. way of war, the military cannot quickly 
replace losses, either in material or highly trained soldiers, nor can the U.S. 
economy sustain a long attritional war. Therefore, U44 > U33 > U22 > U11. 
For China, the best strategy is one in which its competitive advantage can 
be fully brought to bear, which is an all land forces strategy, labeled here as P11.  
The opposite of the reasons why the U.S. cannot fight a long war, China can field 
and sustain a large land army. The next best strategy for China is to fight a land 
war, with only a little weight of effort given to strategic weapons, labeled P22. Next 
is a strategic war with some land power, P33. The worst strategy for China to use 
is an all-out strategic war, P44. Therefore, P11 > P22 > P33 > P44. 
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Placed in a game matrix, the variables would produce the following 
outcome: each country is in a Nash Equilibrium, a position in which no player can 
benefit by departing unilaterally from its strategy (see Figure 32). In grand terms, 
both countries are in stalemate. Replacing the variables with the values derived 
from the formulas produces the same result (see Figure 33): 
 
 
Figure 33.  2x2 matrix showing two Nash equilibria. 
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The values circled in the matrix are ‘Nash equilibriums.’208 A Nash 
equilibrium in a game matrix results when the strategy value is the best the 
protagonist can achieve in relation to the antagonist’s move. The players, in this 
case both the U.S. and China, will not willingly move from this position. Most 
commonly modeled as the ‘chicken’ game, in international relations, a war 
following this model would be a ‘total’ war, in which a loss is perceived as an 
existential threat. In history, power transition wars which follow this type of model 
have produced some of the most violent conflicts imaginable. Rome destroyed 
Carthage and sowed salt on the Carthaginian fields, and the war on the eastern 
                                            
208 Named for the Nobel prize winning mathematician John Nash, made popular in the 
movie, “A Beautiful Mind,” Twentieth Century Fox, 2003. 
Figure 34.  Matrix with values for strategies inserted, showing the same 
Nash equilibriums. 
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front between Germany and the Soviet Union was depicted by both sides as 
against sub-humans, people seen as not fit to live.209  
K. MOVING OFF THE PARETO OPTIMAL 
Plotting their relative positions on a graph is another way to visually depict 
the outcome of the game. In this case, the two countries’ Nash Equilibriums lie 
on what is known as a Pareto Optimal (see Figure 34). According to Straffin, an 
outcome of a game is non-Pareto-optimal if there is another outcome which 
would give both player’s equal to or higher payoffs. An outcome is Pareto 
Optimal if there is no such other outcome.210 
From this Pareto Optimal line, two possible outcomes can occur and both 
were found to be Nash equilibriums. For two points to both be solutions they 
need to be interchangeable and equivalent and these points are not. China and 
the U.S. can move off their Nash equilibriums through economic development, 
hyper-militarization, and other means. For example, the U.S. could invest heavily 
in conventional power, in the hopes of producing a dominant strategy, or China 
could invest in strategic power, in an effort to defeat the U.S. with that strategy. 
For the reasons mentioned in Sections Two and Three, the only plausible 
outcome is an increasingly strategic power oriented China. 
                                            
209 Antony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin (Viking, New York, 2002) and Beevor’s Stalingrad, 
Penguin (New York, 1999). Geoffrey Megargee, War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on 
the Eastern Front, 1941( Rowan & Littlefield, New York, 2005) and Alex Kay (et al), Nazi Policy 
on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, NY, 
2012). For an intimate first had account of the life of a soldier on the eastern front, read Guy 
Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier (Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 1971).  
210 Philip Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 5th Edition (Mathematical Association of 
America, Washington, DC, 1993). 
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As China increases its ability to project power through a nuclear, aircraft 
carrier-centered navy, through development of stealth technology and efficient 
information dominance networks, it will move its ‘dot’ to the right of its plotted 
position (see Figure 35). In the graph, both the U.S. and China are very narrowly 
on a Pareto optimal, in which no player has an advantage over the other. 
However, it is easy to see that with China on its current economic and 
development trajectory, it does not have to travel far to achieve a completely 
dominant position. 
Figure 35.  Graphing the values used in the matrix can visually 
reveal a balance of power between the U.S. and China. As rational 
states, each would want to move is positions away from the Nash 
Equilibriums and to the northeast of the graph. 
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L. ADDING IRREGULAR WAR 
For reasons explained in Section Two, it will not be as easy to ‘move the 
dot’ for the U.S. Resources for greater capability and more high technology 
weapons, in this case money, are growing scarce. The U.S. must look for other 
ways to increase its power. Irregular war, in the form of direct action, or indirect 
support to insurgencies, etc, can provide a way to increase U.S. power against 
China.  There are several reasons that make irregular activities, overt and covert, 
attractive. Because of the risk of total war, great powers utilize coalitions and 
surrogates for several reasons: 1) it helps them maintain or advance their power 
position in their hierarchy in order to preserve economic privileges without risk of 
total war. 2) it helps them induce uncertainty in order to deter strategic 
competitors and preserve their economic privileges without the risk of total war, 
and 3) it helps them counter strategic competitors when confrontation through 
conventional means is politically or strategically undesirable.211 The U.S. will 
seek to minimize its risk by spreading that risk across coalitions, but because 
side payments (in the form of economic and military aid to bring the partner up to 
a higher level of military capability) will differ to each possible coalition member, 
the U.S. will seek to create the strongest coalition with the minimum number of 
partners still capable of defeating China.  Likewise, Arreguin-Toft and Mack212 
have focused on the power inequality as forcing the challenger to adopt irregular 
actions. This is very important because power in the international state system is 
imitative, that is, nations will inevitably commit resources in order to develop 
similar systems as their perceived enemies.213 Kenneth Waltz noted in in his 
                                            
211 Essentially, I forward the idea that irregular actions, both covert and overt, is a strategy to 
minimize risk taking, explained by Prospect Theory. See Rose McDermott’s Risk Taking in 
International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, MI, 1998) where the author also discusses some of the irregular actions listed above. 
212 Ivan Arrequin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” 
International Security, vol. 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001):93–128 and Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations 
Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics, vol. 27 no. 2 (Jan 
1975):175–200.  
213 Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power (Princeton University Press, Princeton 
NJ, 2010).  
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Theory of International Politics214 that “competition produces a tendency towards 
the sameness of the competitors… so the weapons of major contenders, and 
even their strategies begin to look the same all over the world.” Chariots in the 
dim past, the spread of massed formations, the horse, archery, armor have all 
been copied in an interesting application of Bayes Theorem. Arms races are the 
inevitable result. The British gained an empire with their unmatched naval power, 
and before the First World War, Germany followed with a massive naval build-up. 
Suspicion of each other followed with tragic results. Hitler may or may not have 
wanted war, but her certainly wanted a powerful military, and in the U.S.’ own 
recent past, it went ‘toe to toe’ with the Soviet Union. Victory in the Cold War may 
have sown the seeds for the current ‘Asian pivot’ against China.  
Conventional and strategic power as presented for this thesis is imitative, 
with each country attempting to win by producing more, or ‘better’ weapons 
systems. Nations feel their own security is increased with a bulky, in depth 
national defense because they can never be sure of another nation’s intentions. 
States must assume that all weapons have an offensive capability, and whether 
the threat is perceived or real, nations must then be prepared to meet armed 
force with armed force. This, despite the evidence that irregular war, defined as 
force used asymmetrically (in ways that have not been prepared for) against 
conventional power,215 or forces used in irregular ways against conventional 
power have a large mitigating effect against of conventional strength. It then 
follows that an asymmetric capability is an irregular capability, but not all irregular 
activities are asymmetric.216 For example, the use of submarines by Germany in 
the First World War was asymmetric and irregular at the time, but by World War 
                                            
214 Waltz, International Politics, 127. 
215 From here, I drop the ‘game-ism’ of separating power into conventional and strategic 
elements. More traditionally, all military power is conventional power. 
216 Rather than conducting an exhausting review of all the literature which attempts to 
describe asymmetry and irregular war, I use as my basis the DoD definition which says 
‘asymmetric’ is the application of dissimilar... methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s 
strengths and ‘irregular war’ seeks influence over a… population… and favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches… but may use the full range of military capabilities. See Joint Pub 1–02, 
Washington, DC, 8 Nov 2010. 
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II, it had become an accepted part of regular warfare. In this sense, then, there is 
an arc to asymmetry. New methods and capabilities when introduced are 
asymmetric but once they are widely adopted and methods for countering them 
are developed, they become very regular. Mounted archers, strategic bombing, 
machines guns, UAVs and stealth have all had outsized impacts on conflict when 
introduced, but have since entered the regular arsenals of countries.217 
Irregular activities are simpler to comprehend. While some asymmetric 
capabilities have been introduced in irregular applications, most irregular war is 
simply a change of substance and objective from regular war. For example, while 
conventional war emphasizes speed and mass and firepower, irregular war puts 
a premium on persistence, low-visibility, and when needed, relative 
superiority.218 Irregular warfare often requires special skills, which in a way can 
be considered asymmetric, especially when employed against conventional 
forces. However, the key to identifying irregular war is, when taken with the 
principles above, is the application of direct or indirect force against an objective 
when it is unexpected and for which no defenses have been planned. The great 
raids, some of which are discussed below, fall into this category. 
The U.S. record with irregular war achieving strategic goals is mixed, not 
least because some of the counter-insurgency campaigns have timelines 
reflected in decades. However, enough of a record exists to build a fairly 
defensible ratio of success to failure. This ratio will provide the probability of 
success used above. They are: 
                                            
217 In an ongoing demonstration of my proposal that power is imitative, check China’s 
development of a stealth capable figurehter at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/01/first-video-of-chinas-new-
stealth-figurehter/ and at Jane’s Defence Weekly, 31 Oct, 2012. It is called the Shen Fei. 
218 William McCraven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations (Presidio Press, New 
York, 1996). 
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Son Tay Raid – unsuccessful219 (The raid was a tactically brilliant, but the 
strategic goal of recovering the POWs was not attained.) 
Desert One – unsuccessful220 
El Salvador – successful221 
Somalia 1993 – unsuccessful222 
Afghanistan Phase One (2001–2002) – successful223 
Colombia – successful224 
                                            
219 For all the Uses of irregular action, begin with Richard Grimmet’s Instances of Use of 
United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2009, Congressional Research Service, Jan 27th 
2010. I have assigned a value of ‘unsuccessful’ to the Son Tay Raid since its objective was to 
recover prisoners of war and at the time of the raid, the POWs had been moved. Even though the 
tactical execution of the raid was almost perfect, it did not achieve its objective.  Read also John 
Gargus.’ The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten, (AM University 
Press, College Station, TX, 2007). 
220 Charles Kamps, “Operation Eagle Claw,” Air & Space Power Journal, found online at 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html , and Mark 
Bowden, The Desert One Debacle,” The Atlantic, May 2006, online edition. Also Charles Cogan 
has a well researched article using many primary sources, “Desert One and its Disorders,” The 
Journal of Military History, vol. 67, no. 1 (Jan 2003): 201–216, and the PBS video “Jimmy Carter” 
found at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/carter/player/ is a solid report on the 
strategic implications of the hostage situation and the preparation for the attempted rescue. 
221 Charles Cale, “The United States Military Advisory Group in El Salvador,” U.S. Army 
Professional Writing Collection, Leavenworth KS and Becca Smith’s Civil Affairs in El Salvador, 
Grenada, and Panama, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jan 28, 2009, found online 
at http://csis.org/publication/civil-affairs-el-salvador-grenada-and-panama 
222
 Walter Clarke, and Jeffrey Herbst, editors, Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed 
Humanitarian Intervention (Westview Press Boulder, CO, 1997). Prestowitz, Clyde, Rogue 
Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (Basic Books, New York, 
2003). Stevenson, Jonathan, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia (Naval Institute 
Press, Annapolis, MD, 1995). For the best tactical account of the battle of October 3rd and 4th, 
read Sangvic, Roger, Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure, School of Advanced Military 
Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1998, found at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA366316 and of course, Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down. 
223 It is too soon to find solidly researched articles on the success and failure of of U.S. 
operations in Afghanistan, but there are several which together give a fairly accurate picture of 
the first phase of actions in Afghanistan. They are Linda Robinson’s Masters of Chaos, Public 
Affairs, New York, 2004 and G. Herrings Army War College monograph, “The War In 
Afghanistan,” U.S. Army War College, DTIC located at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA420140. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has provided 
multiple reports on progress in Afghanistan, beginning in June 2002 and taken together provide a 
clear picture of successes and setbacks there. Also Carl Conetta’s “Strange Victory,” Project on 
Defense Alternatives, 30 January 2002 was one of the earliest accounts of the abrupt success in 
Afghanistan, found herehttp://129.11.76.45/papers/pmt/exhibits/703/0201strangevic.pdf. Sean 
Maloney, “Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 
1,(2007), 27–44. For a counter point, read David Rohde’s and David Sanger’s “How the Good 
War in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, Aug 12, 2007. 
 91 
Bin Laden Raid – successful225 
Somalia Hostage Rescue – Successful226 
Philippines – successful227 
 
There have been six successful applications of irregular war since 1970, 
the year of the Son Tay Raid, and three that were unsuccessful. It is no 
coincidence that the unsuccessful IW applications occurred early. As the United 
States devoted more resources to building irregular warfare capabilities, the 
efficiency of those abilities increased, along with a higher success rate. 
 Imagine irregular warfare capabilities as occupying a set, c. The U.S.’ 
sum of those capabilities would be:  
                                                                                                                                  
224 Russel Crandall, Driven by Drugs (Lynn Rienner Publishers, Boulder CO, 2002) and an 
published m/s by Bruce Bagley, “Drug Trafficking, Political Violence, and U.S. policy in Colombia 
in the 1990s,” dated January 2001 are the best places to begin understanding U.S. involvement 
in Colombia.  The CRS report “Colombia: Issues for Congress,” by June Beittel, Mar 18, 2011 is 
excellent as well. Unfortunately, much of the military support provided by the U.S. to Colombia 
remains classified.  
225 The best sources for information on the Bin Laden raid are Nicholas Schmidle, “ Getting 
Bin Laden,” The New Yorker, August 8th 2011 and the CBS News documentary, “Killing bin 
Laden,” which aired Sept 9, 2012. 
226 Julian Barnes, “Navy SEALs Rescue Hostages in Somalia,” Wall Street Journal, online 
edition, 26 January 2012. 
227Similar to military operations in Colombia and elsewhere, much information is classified. 
The best open source is are semi-government publications like Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Military 
Operations in the GWOT: Philippines, CRS, 20 January 2006, and Thomas Lun, “The Republic of 
the Philipp.ines and U.S. Interests,” CRS, 3 January 2011 and Bruce Vaughn, et al., “Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia,” CRS, 16 October 2009. Also Tom Shanker, “U.S. Military to stay in Philippines, 
New York Times, online edition, 20 AugU.S.t 2009 and Donna Miles, “Task Force Promotes 
Philipp.ine Military Capability,” DefenseNews, 18 July 2012. For Abu Sayyaf, read Zachary 
Abuza’s “Balik-Terrorism: The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle 
Barracks, PA, September 2005, found at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub625.pdf. Raymond Bonner and Carlos 
Conde, “U.S. and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader,” New York Times, July 23, 




where c is the capability and x is the number of capabilities multiplied by the 
probability of success. The new value of the U.S.’ power would be: 
 
where p is the highest value of national power determined previously and β is the 
sum of U.S. irregular warfare capabilities. Adding this value will produce a higher 
value for national power, thus moving the U.S.’ position on the graph to the right, 























Figure 36.  Irregular activities are an excellent way to move the 
Pareto line in favor of the U.S., with a reciprocal decrease in the 
PRC position. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the game described in Section Five, the moves are simultaneous, with 
no communication between the U.S. and China once the moves begin. Real life 
is rarely like this. Commitments, threats and promises are possible. In this 
section, I will analyze what possible moves might help or hurt the U.S. in a 
conflict with China. Translating the pure power game in Section Five into realistic 
world scenarios is difficult, but not impossible. Rarely do policy makers baldly use 
strong words like invade, force, victory, and threaten. However, the marriage of 
game theory and international relations requires it. 
Game theory has been expanded over the years to include analysis of 
strategic moves by the players. During strategic moves, we analyze what might 
happen if one player moves first, or forces the other player to move first. For 
example, the most likely place for a demonstration of Chinese strategic power is 
in the Strait of Taiwan, while a Chinese land war could take place on the Korean 
peninsula, in Central Asia, or along its southern border, particularly with India. 
While the evidence points to China learning how, it could not sustain or 
secure a large land army beyond its contiguous borders, say in Africa. That could 
very well change as China invests in a strategic navy. However, as seen in 
Section Five, the PRC has a dominant advantage in conventional power, while 
currently the U.S. has an edge in strategic power. Because the China/U.S. 
conflict is a non-zero-sum game with communication, there are ways to 
ameliorate the implications of a PRC win. Already the United States has several 
alliances in place, the effect of which is to increase power available to a U.S.-led 
coalition. For example, Japan, South Korea and Australia have mutual defense 
treaties with the U.S. in place.  So in the event, the power available to the U.S. is 
X + J+A+K, whereas Chinese power would remain at Y. 
This essentially constitutes a first move by the U.S., and increases the 
cost of the conflict to China.   However, U.S. deterrent moves such as signing 
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defense treaties with neighboring countries and deployments of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet could be seen as threatening, precipitating a first move by China. If China 
were to attack with its nascent force projection power, then currently the U.S. 
might be able to eke out a victory. Unfortunately, the Chinese leadership and 
strategic thinkers would also understand Theory of Moves, and power projection 
by the U.S. over Taiwan could lead the PRC to move into Central Asia, a move 
which the U.S. could not counter effectively. 
Although the U.S. margin of victory in a strategic war is thin, it still 
provides the best chance for a victory. In any interaction with China, the U.S. 
would want to engage in a strategic war. The U.S. could threaten China with 
moves in Central Asia, which in theory could force China to respond with a land 
campaign to secure its resources there (see Figure 36). 
 
 According to the game in Section Five, both countries engaging in a 
conventional land war predicts the worst outcome for each country. If the threat is 
believable, and the U.S. launches a land-based task force into central Asia, ala 
the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan, then China could very well launch from 
the west. This would provide an opportunity for the U.S. to maneuver its strategic 
Figure 36.  Matrix showing how with threatened land war 
China responds with land war. 
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forces into the South China Seas in order to secure its own and its allies’ 
resources. 
However, the cost of war for the U.S. both in expenditures and possible 
loss of dominance in the current international system is great.  The best option 
for the U.S. is to force China to spend its revenue not on confronting the U.S. but 
on expensive demonstrations of power against surrogates. Application of 
irregular war, such as insurgencies, internal defense, and unconventional warfare 
along its long southern and western border, as well as in North Korea, could 
draw the attention away from direct confrontation with the U.S. 
Confrontation with China over oil and gas in the South China Sea, or over 
Taiwan, would be expensive, depending on how we choose to engage. Our 
game shows that as China grows, the likelihood of a U.S. ‘win’ grows less so. 
There is an opportunity to slow Chinese growth by looking to its western borders 
with Central Asia. Heavy Chinese investment in Central Asia brings with it 
domestic policies tilted towards China.228 There is also a fear of heavy Chinese 
migration following business and tipping the balance of power towards the Han 
Chinese in the sparsely populated Central Asian nations. There is an opportunity 
to exploit the ethnic differences between the Chinese and local populations, 
through which Chinese trucks and pipelines must pass.  Far from being viewed 
as another potential loss of influence to the U.S, this actually weakens the PRC 
since it increases the number of self-declared ‘vital interests’ it must defend. The 
United States must defend its economic interests around the world, and so too 
would China. Chinese power applied to places like Central Asia and Africa would 
be a net subtraction from the power available to for conflict in the South China 
Seas. For every insurgency, there is counter-insurgency (COIN), for every raid, 
there must be an increase in defense of sites previously considered not militarily 
valuable.  Foreign internal defense (FID) and stability operations (SO) can 
                                            
228 Edward Wong, “China Quietly Extends Footprints Into Central Asia,” New York Times, 2 
January 2011, online edition. 
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increase a state’s power, and create allies for the United States. This is a clear 
real-world demonstration of the effect of the Pareto Optimal. 
The long timeline for success in irregular war, like the U.S. involvement in 
El Salvador, Colombia, the Philippines, or East Africa also makes irregular war 
against China attractive. If Chinese interests can be divided between social 
stability at home and their interests abroad, there exists a window through which 
deterrence can succeed. 
The CCP is beginning to experience the stress of having to choose 
between guns and butter. The CCP must continue to attract investment in order 
to continue the job creation that is the basis of its ‘social contract’. While foreign 
companies are eager to take advantage of cheap labor, the government must 
fund the massive population shifts from the countryside to the manufacturing 
cities. The burden of providing healthcare, education, and a clean environment 
falls on a government that is struggling to provide a minimum of these 
services.229 Traditionally, the Chinese have grown old being supported by their 
children, with large extended families often living together. However, there is now 
a bulge of older Chinese who suffer from the ‘4–2–1’ problem, in which one child 
could be expected to support two parents and two grandparents. With rising 
standards of living and inflation, this is impossible, and so a growing number of 
elderly Chinese will come to rely on the nascent, but growing, Chinese social 
security net.230 
After the revolution, social programs were at the bottom of the CCP’s 
priorities. Even after Mao, the reforms of Deng in the 1970s and 1980s were 
committed to economic growth.  What has suffered has been social spending- on 
healthcare, education, and safety nets for the elderly. As their population ages, 
Chinese are demanding new government benefits and entitlements, that the PRC 
will have to balance with their move towards global power. 
                                            
229 Fowler, “China counts the cost”, 12-A.12. 
230 The Economist, “China’s Achilles Heel,” April 21, 2012. 
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This thesis concludes that the U.S. has an edge over the Chinese when it 
comes to weapons of a strategic nature. Sixty years of a robust economy have 
produced extraordinary gains in technology that have allowed the U.S. many 
options in war beyond the massed formation and heavy firepower predicated by 
large land-based armies. However, that advantage is finite. The U.S. economy is 
unlikely to produce the gains seen in the 1950s and 1960s when the rest of the 
world was still devastated by the Second World War. Since the fall of Soviet 
Union in 1991, most of the world’s national economies have liberalized, with the 
effect that industry has moved to new areas with cheap labor and low costs. 
China has far and away benefitted the most. 
China will continue to close the technological gap as it buys advanced 
technology from around the world, while growing its own domestic R&D abilities. 
The efficacy of the vast U.S. conventional deterrent is in some doubt because of 
the immense cost of training and maintaining it. The ability of the U.S. to continue 
to make only incremental improvements in capabilities at ever-growing costs is 
also in doubt because of increasing commitments to its social spending. 
The results of the game clearly indicate that the U.S. should invest in non-
conventional means that can be used to deter China. Diplomacy and irregular 
war are two sides of the same coin.  
DoD has already taken steps to increase the size of SOF, a relatively 
inexpensive option for irregular war.231 In the FY 12 Budget, the President has 
asked for 10.5 billion dollars for USSCOM, with about $3 billion funded with 
overseas contingency operations (OCO) dollars. Still, in contrast with the U.S. 
services’ $315 billion in Operations & Maintenance and procurement costs, IW 
capabilities seem cheap by comparison.  
 A concerted action by the entire U.S. government mechanism in 
Central Asia would focus Chinese attention there, and away from their military 
                                            
231 Andrew Fieckert. “ U.S. SOF: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional 
Research Service. Washington, DC, 15 JUL 2011, 2. 
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build-up in the South China Sea. It could have the double benefit of shoring up 
our own interests in the region, turning the nascent countries of Central Asia 
back to the American fold. In the early Cold War, the Marshall Plan was a foil 
against the increasing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, and irregular actions, 
some successful and some not, helped hasten the collapse of Stalinist-Lenin 
Communism.232 
As the U.S. seeks ways to increase its power or reduce Chinese power, it 
must beware of the status quo point. That is the level of power below which 
China cannot guarantee its own security. If negotiations and IW move the PRC 
below this point, China would have no option but to attack in order to secure 
itself, the classic case of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. The object of the 
game should be to move China off the Pareto Optimal and its dominant strategy 
without weakening it to a point below the status quo.  
Time is also on the U.S.’ side, as China’s own demography shifts and 
becomes more like the US. China has a huge working population, but it is aging. 
The working population can easily support dependent children and elderly 
parents.233 Compare that to America which currently has 13% of the population 
over 65. By 2050, the China’s percentage will be 26%, higher than the U.S.234 
with only 22 percent working. The CCP has experimented with loosening the one 
                                            
232 There have been several waves of revisionist thinking on the Cold War and the eventual 
fall of the Soviet Union, beginning with William Williams who claimed it was not the U.S.SR 
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the U.S.A to have ‘open doors’ around the world (see Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Norton, 
New York,1988). For the purpose of this thesis, the United States did take actions, and the 
U.S.SR did fall. The most significant Cold War historian is John Lewis Gaddis, The United States 
and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972. See 
also John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold 
War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp.. 171–190 and John Lewis Gaddis, We 
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). For newer treatments 
Using old Soviet archives opened after 1991, see Kathleen Burk, “The Marshall Plan: Filling in 
Some of the Blanks,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 2001), pp.. 267–294, 
and Diane B. Kunz, “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of Motives,” in Peter Grose, 
ed., The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 13, 
and Eduard Mark, “The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, 
No. 3 (July 1997), pp.. 383–415. 
233 Naughton, Transitions and Growth, 2006. 
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child policy, which would ease the demographic problem. Other countries like 
Japan and Korea have grappled with the strain of an aging population, too. It will 
be harder in China, however, because, as Barry Naughton observes, “China will 
grow old before it has had the opportunity to grow rich.”235  
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis provides a jumping off point for future research. While the 
hypothesis and conclusions are intriguing, the model should be validated. This 
can be done by substituting the values for national powers into the model for 
other states that have had observable transitions in the past. The COW 
researchers have provided reliable data on which to base those computations all 
way back to 1815.  Early in Section One, I provided a figure which showed 
transitions, both as a result of war and peaceful transitions. The equations for 
determining national power used in Section Five should also predict the winner in 
those conflicts. This ability to reproduce similar results in other conflicts is very 
important to the validation of the model.236  
 A study could also be done in which the capabilities of irregular 
forces around the world are catalogued and indexed. This would provide 
important data from which the relative strengths of irregular forces could be 
determined much like the power values derived in Section Five. This would also 
serve an important validation function in the model. 
  
                                            
235 Naughton, Transitions and Growth, 2006. 
236 Washburn, Combat Modeling. 2009. 
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